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Abstract
This dissertation emphasizes the financial instability inherent in modern financial markets and the
real economy and introduces a different aspect to dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
models with financial frictions. Specifically, I introduce a role for the equity market in financial
intermediation, firm production and household consumption—termed the equity price channel.
This innovative model forms the foundation of three research papers which successively studies:
the systemic and pro-cyclical effect of equity, the sources of credit spread variability, and the role
of contingent convertible capital (CoCos) in Basel III macroprudential regulation.
In chapter two, I show that the equity price channel significantly exacerbates business cy-
cle fluctuations through both financial accelerator and bank capital channels. I find that a New-
Keynesian DSGE model with an equity price channel well mimics the U.S. business cycle and
reproduces the strong procyclicality of equity. The results also reflect the increasing emphasis on
common equity capital in Basel regulations. This is beneficial in terms of financial stability, but
amplifies and propagates shocks to the real economy.
In chapter three, I establish the prevailing financial factors that influence credit spread vari-
ability, and its impact on the U.S. business cycle over the Great Moderation and Great Recession
periods. Over both periods, I find an important role for bank market power (sticky rate adjustments
and loan rate markups) on credit spread variability in the U.S. business cycle. Equity prices exacer-
bate movements in credit spreads through the financial accelerator channel, but cannot be regarded
as a main driving force of credit spread variability. Both the financial accelerator and bank capital
channels play a significant role in propagating the movements of credit spreads. Across the last
three U.S. recession periods (1990−91, 2001, and 2007−09) I observe a remarkable decline in
the influence of technology and monetary policy shocks. Whereas, there is an increasing trend
in the contribution of loan rate markup shocks to the variability of retail credit spreads. The in-
fluence of loan-to-value shocks has declined since the 1990−91 recession, while the bank capital
requirement shock exacerbates and prolongs credit spread variability over the 2007−09 recession
period.
In chapter four, I show that countercyclical capital requirements (as in Basel III) and contingent
convertible capital provide an effective dual approach to macroprudential policy. On the one hand,
a countercyclical capital adequacy rule dominates CoCos in the stabilization of real shocks. That
ii
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is, by raising a capital buffer the Basel III regime mitigates the build-up of excess credit supply
and, as a result, constrains the expansion of overleveraged banks. On the other hand, CoCos
have a strong advantage over the Basel III regime against negative financial shocks. Here, CoCos
effectively re-capitalize banks, reduce financial distress in a timely manner, and mitigate knock-
on effects to the real economy. Countercyclical capital requirements and contingent convertible
capital instruments therefore limit financial instability, and its influence on the real economy.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The global financial crisis and recession that began in 2007 continues to shape macroeconomic
research and, more importantly, it has revitalized the role of financial frictions in shaping business
cycle fluctuations. In this respect, modern business cycle theory provides a coherent framework
for research on the dynamic interactions between financial markets and the real economy. Until
recently, however, the core general equilibrium framework used in policy analysis excluded any
formal specification of financial markets.1
This dissertation emphasizes the financial instability inherent in modern financial markets and
the real economy, and provides a framework to study the financial factors that give rise to financial
instability. More specifically, it provides a deeper understanding of how financial intermediation
modifies the transmission mechanism of monetary policy and other macroeconomic shocks; and
includes new insights on limiting financial instability, and its associated influence on the real
economy.
To do this, I introduce a different aspect to dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
models with financial frictions. Namely, I develop a role for the equity market in financial interme-
diation, firm production and household consumption—termed the equity price channel. The idea
here is to capture the systemic interconnection between the financial system and the real economy.
This innovative model forms the foundation of three research papers which successively incorpo-
rates: the systemic and pro-cyclical effect of equity, the sources of credit spread variability over
the Great Moderation and Great Recession periods, and the role of contingent convertible capital
in Basel III macroprudential regulation.
Since the onset of the crisis, a number of challenges have come to face modern business cycle
theory. That is to say, without a formal specification for financial intermediation, general equilib-
rium models fail to explain important regularities in the business cycle. Firstly, asset prices have
prevalent consequences for real economic activity. On the one hand, asset price fluctuations af-
fect the real economy through, for example, households’ financial wealth and the market value of
1See Appendix A for a description of the core DSGE framework, which summarizes the benchmark model used in
policy analysis from the late 1980s up to the financial crisis (see also, Tovar, 2009).
1
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 2
collateral. On the other hand, asset prices absorb and react to market expectations and macroeco-
nomic conditions which, in turn, reflect information about the expected path of the business cycle.
This interconnection between financial markets and the real economy, however, has received much
less attention in general equilibrium models.
Secondly, one notable recurring characteristic of financial stress in recessions is that of widen-
ing credit spreads. As a result, systemic disruptions to financial intermediation have shown how
large variations in credit spreads dislocate the interaction between short-term interest rates and real
economic activity. The recent crisis has therefore also called into question the lack of a prominent
role for bank market power and multiple interest rate setting in dynamic macroeconomic models,
and subsequently, the effectiveness of the interest-rate policy of central banks (Woodford, 2010;
Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2011).2 At the same time, the synonymous role of the equity market can-
not be ignored. As pointed out by Brunnermeier (2009) and Adrian and Shin (2011), both credit
spreads and equity markets in the U.S. exhibited significant financial stress during the Great Re-
cession of 2007−09, and both significantly affected real economic activity and the business cycle
(see also, Castelnuovo and Nisticò, 2010; Gilchrist and Zakrajšek, 2012). In fact, the 1990−91
and 2001 U.S. recessions during the Great Moderation exhibited similar financial stress through
widening credit spreads and collapsing equity prices. Farmer (2012b) goes further and argues that
it is the stock market crash of 2008, triggered by a collapse in house prices, that caused the Great
Recession.
Thirdly, it has become far more urgent to provide research on the dynamic interactions between
macroprudential policies and the real economy (Galati and Moessner, 2013). Especially since
macroprudential guidelines stipulated in the Basel Accord failed to mitigate recent global episodes
of financial distress. In doing so, policy analysis and macroeconomic prediction can be better
organised and efficiently executed to avoid the build-up of financial imbalances.
Indeed, from the late 1980s up to the financial crisis, most quantitative macroeconomic mod-
els assumed a rather primitive treatment of the interaction between financial markets and the real
economy. The most prominent work to introduce a role for credit market frictions in business
cycle fluctuations is that of Bernanke and Gertler (1989). Thereafter, seminal works by Kiyotaki
and Moore (1997) and Bernanke et al. (1999) showed how credit market frictions amplified and
propagated business cycle fluctuations.3 However, these frictions arise solely from the creditwor-
thiness of borrowers—the so-called ‘financial accelerator’ channel. In fact, the benchmark model
lacked any significant role for monetary aggregates, financial intermediation, or multiple interest
rates. That said, Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) was an early and much needed contribution on
the role of banking in monetary policy.
Lacking an equity market and a detailed banking sector underestimates the explanatory power
2Bank market power, here, specifically refers to sticky interest rate adjustment and interest rate markups.
3A number of notable contributions in the literature include, amongst others: Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), Kocher-
lakota (2000) and Cooley et al. (2004).
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 3
of financial frictions, and inhibits financial stability research and policy analysis for central banks
and government. To be sure, the benchmark framework is fast adapting to incorporate these fea-
tures (e.g., Castelnuovo and Nisticò, 2010; Christiano et al., 2010; Cúrdia and Woodford, 2010;
Gerali et al., 2010; de Walque et al., 2010). Yet, continued work is required in modeling financial
markets that better capture the macroeconomic consequences of: the heterogeneous banking sec-
tor; the equity market in an interconnected financial system; Basel bank regulation; and financial
frictions associated with collateralized debt, heterogeneous rate stickiness, and bank leverage.4
These are the critical features identified in this dissertation that will be incorporated within the
current benchmark framework.
Following Smets and Wouters (2003), Christiano et al. (2005) and Gerali et al. (2010), this
dissertation adopts the mainstream methodology for model calibration, estimation and robust-
ness analysis. The models are estimated with Bayesian technique using macroeconomic time-
series data of the U.S. economy. Similarly, the calibration of the model matches key steady-state
features of the U.S. economy. Four methods are used to validate the model results. The first
compares the closeness of well-established estimated parameters in the literature. The second
shows how well the cyclical properties of the model (i.e., the second moments) compare with
that of the data and the literature evidence. The third determines whether the model results—
for impulse response functions, forecast error variance decompositions, and historical variance
decompositions—conform to business cycle theory and evidence. The fourth compares the pre-
dictive power and robustness of the DSGE model to changes in its assumptions, and to the vector
auto-regression approach.
The layout and main findings of the dissertation are as follows. In chapter two, I show that
the equity price channel significantly exacerbates business cycle fluctuations through both the
financial accelerator channel and the bank capital channel. I find that a New-Keynesian DSGE
model with an equity price channel well mimics the U.S. business cycle and reproduces the strong
procyclicality of equity. The results also reflect the increasing emphasis on common equity capital
in Basel regulations. This is beneficial in terms of financial stability, but amplifies and propagates
shocks to the real economy.
In chapter three, I establish the prevailing financial factors that influence credit spread vari-
ability, and the mechanisms through which shocks impact credit spread variability over the Great
Moderation and Great Recession periods. Over both periods, I find an important role for bank
market power (sticky rate adjustments and loan rate markups) on credit spread variability in the
U.S. business cycle. Equity prices exacerbate movements in credit spreads through the financial
accelerator channel, but cannot be regarded as a main driving force of credit spread variability.
Both the financial accelerator and bank capital channels play a significant role in propagating the
movements of credit spreads. Across the last three U.S. recession periods (1990−91, 2001, and
4Other important shortcomings include, for example, financial frictions associated with imperfect information (i.e.,
moral hazard, monitoring costs, and adverse selection) and risk premiums.
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2007−09) I observe a remarkable decline in the influence of technology and monetary policy
shocks. Whereas, there is an increasing trend in the contribution of loan rate markup shocks to
the variability of retail credit spreads. The influence of loan-to-value shocks has declined since
the 1990−91 recession, while the bank capital requirement shock exacerbates and prolongs credit
spread variability over the 2007−09 recession period.
In chapter four, I introduce a role for contingent convertible capital (CoCos) in countercyclical
macroprudential policy, and study the effectiveness of bank capital requirements and CoCos in
limiting financial instability. I find that countercyclical capital requirements (as in Basel III) and
contingent convertible capital provide an effective dual approach to macroprudential policy. On
the one hand, a countercyclical capital adequacy rule dominates CoCos in the stabilization of real
shocks. That is, by raising a capital buffer the Basel III regime mitigates the build-up of excess
credit supply and, as a result, constrains the expansion of overleveraged banks. On the other hand,
CoCos have a strong advantage over the Basel III regime against negative financial shocks. Here,
CoCos effectively re-capitalize banks, reduce financial distress in a timely manner, and mitigate
knock-on effects to the real economy. Countercyclical capital requirements and contingent con-
vertible capital instruments therefore limit financial instability and its associated influence on the
real economy.
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Chapter 2
The equity price channel in a
New-Keynesian DSGE model with
financial frictions and banking
2.1 Introduction
This paper studies the role of the equity price channel in business cycle fluctuations, and highlights
the equity price channel as a different aspect to general equilibrium models with financial frictions
and, as a result, emphasizes the systemic influence of financial markets on the real economy. To do
so, I develop a canonical New-Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model
incorporating the financial accelerator channel (see, Bernanke and Gertler, 1989; Bernanke et al.,
1999) and the bank capital channel (see, Markovic, 2006; Meh and Moran, 2010).1 Moreover, I
introduce a tractable role for the equity market in banking, entrepreneur and household economic
activities. By synthesizing the roles of the bank’s capital structure, the entrepreneur’s net worth
and the demand side of the equity market, this paper highlights the systemic influence of the
equity price channel on business cycle fluctuations through consumption, production and banking
activities.
Asset prices have prevalent consequences for real economic activity.2 On the one hand, as-
set price fluctuations affect the real economy through, for example, households’ financial wealth
and the market value of collateral (e.g., Iacoviello, 2005). On the other hand, asset prices absorb
and react to market expectations and macroeconomic conditions which, in turn, reflect informa-
tion about the expected path of the business cycle (e.g., Castelnuovo and Nisticò, 2010). This
interconnection between financial markets and the real economy, however, has received much less
attention in general equilibrium models (BCBS, 2011).
1The financial accelerator captures the “endogenous developments in credit markets [that] work to propagate and
amplify shocks to the macroeconomy" (Bernanke et al., 1999, p.1345). Whereas, the bank capital channel “encompasses
shocks to the cost or the value of bank capital that can affect bank lending" (Markovic, 2006, p.9).
2Cochrane (2008) provides an extensive overview of asset prices in financial markets and the real economy.
5
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Figure 2.1: Equity market collapses and U.S. recessions
There are at least three reasons for including a direct role for equity in consumption, produc-
tion and banking activities. Firstly, the strong correlation between financial markets and the U.S.
business cycle is well established (e.g., Bernanke and Lown, 1992; Brunnermeier, 2009; Adrian
and Shin, 2011; Gilchrist and Zakrajšek, 2012; Jermann and Quadrini, 2012). Figure 2.1 high-
lights the common occurrence of equity price collapses and U.S. recessions. Moreover, Christiano
et al. (2008) and Farmer (2012a) show how self-fulfilling asset price expectations can induce
equity market collapses and macroeconomic instability. Secondly, banking sector data supports
the inclusion of the equity price channel in models with financial frictions. Figure 2.2 illus-
trates the importance of capturing the market capitalization of bank equity capital.3 Over the
period 1992Q04−2003Q04, the bank capital structure of all commercial banks in the U.S. consis-
tently comprised, on average, 46.7% equity surplus and 44.6% retained earnings. However, since
2003Q04 the ratios diverged considerably, with equity surplus peaking at 77.3% and retained
earnings declining to 18.7% by the end of 2009. Finally, regulatory authorities are increasingly
emphasizing common equity as a safety-net to adverse bank shocks. Figure 2.3 shows the mini-
mum capital requirements for banks according to the proposed Basel III regulations (BIS, 2012).
By 2015, tier 1 common equity must reach a minimum of 4.5% of risk-weighted assets (RWA). By
2019, two additional common equity requirements must be met: a 2.5% capital conservation buffer
and a 0 − 2.5% country-specific discretionary counter-cyclical buffer. This implies a potential 7
− 9.5% common equity requirement out of a possible 10.5 − 13% of RWA. The requirement
for retained earnings falls from 2% to 1.5% of RWA. Both Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3 show the
significant structural shift towards greater common equity capital leveraging in U.S. commercial
3Data source: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC, 2012).
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Figure 2.3: Basel III minimum capital requirements
banks.
This paper is related to the literature on the interaction between equity prices and macroeco-
nomic fundamentals. More specifically, the interaction between equity prices and the real econ-
omy, through the household wealth effect, specifies an active role for the demand-side effect of
the equity market in a standard dynamic New-Keynesian business cycle analysis. Wei (2010)
points out that this expanding literature has not been widely studied within the New-Keynesian
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CHAPTER 2. THE EQUITY PRICE CHANNEL 8
framework. He goes on to show that a New-Keynesian sticky-price model is well able to generate
the positive correlation between real dividend yields and inflation observed in the data. That is,
because inflation makes shareholders more risk averse the required equity premium and the real
discount rate rise. As a result, the sticky-price structure of New-Keynesian models highlight the
influence of monetary policy rules on the relationship between equity prices, inflation and the real
economy.
Indeed, previous studies often fell short of including both an explicit demand-side equity mar-
ket interaction and a coherent way for allowing equity prices to directly impact consumption,
production and banking activities. On the one hand, Castelnuovo and Nisticò (2010) show how
the demand-side interaction between heterogenous investors produces a strong financial wealth
effect on consumption. However, the stock market wealth effect on households serves as the sole
financial market mechanism to study the relationship between equity markets and monetary pol-
icy.4 On the other hand, Christiano et al. (2010) establish an economic link between bank funding
and bank lending in which equity plays a role. Their analysis validates the important contribu-
tion of the credit market and the equity market for replicating the U.S. business cycle. However,
to capture crucial equity market information in production activities, equity price data serves as
a proxy for the price of capital. Whereby a financial wealth shock (i.e., a shock to the value of
equity) has a contemporaneous impact on entrepreneurs’ net worth, and hence creditworthiness.
This mechanism is distinct from that of bank funding: for the reason that banks issue short-term
marketable securities to households to finance their loans to entrepreneurs. As a result, the model
overlooks a tractable and micro-founded framework for equity pricing, by which equity prices
directly influence consumption, production and banking activities.5
This paper is also related to the bank capital literature. Markovic (2006) and Meh and Moran
(2010) provide evidence on the importance of bank capital for bank lending and funding, and the
need to entrench the bank capital channel in the financial frictions paradigm. Markovic (2006)
shows how households’ investment in bank equity shares influences the cost and value of bank
capital. Although no financial frictions arise from within the banking sector and the representative
bank is non-optimizing, he finds a significant role for the bank capital channel in propagating
shocks to bank lending and, subsequently, the real economy. Meh and Moran (2010) show how
bank capital arises to mitigate the moral hazard problem between banks and their creditors. As
a result, the bank capital channel greatly amplifies and propagates both real and financial shocks
on economic activity. In addition, Van den Heuvel (2008) finds that bank capital requirements
limit the ability of banks to satisfy households’ liquidity preferences which, in turn, significantly
hinder real economic activity. Indeed, only recently did Markovic (2006), Van den Heuvel (2008)
4Castelnuovo and Nisticò (2010, p.1724-5) therefore highlight the need to extend their baseline model to include,
e.g., a non-trivial role for financial intermediaries. Here, they also discuss the implications of not considering a wider
range of macroeconomic factors such as endogenous physical capital accumulation and asset-price fluctuations on
investment.
5See Christiano et al. (2010, p.5−10) for comments on the counterfactual responses from the model.
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 2. THE EQUITY PRICE CHANNEL 9
and Christiano et al. (2010) support the idea of including equity in bank capital accumulation.
However, none of these studies consider the demand-side effect of the equity market on banking
operations. In this study, I introduce an equity price channel to close these gaps in the interaction
between equity prices and the real economy in the literature.
The contribution of the paper is two-fold. Firstly, by addressing the gaps in the literature I
highlight the equity price channel as a different aspect to general equilibrium models with financial
frictions. This equity price channel links consumption, production and banking activities, whereby
equity prices affect both households’ and entrepreneurs’ financial wealth, and bank assets are
partially financed by equity. Secondly, I estimate the model with Bayesian techniques, using U.S.
data over the sample period 1982Q01−2012Q01. I show that a New-Keynesian DSGE model with
an equity price channel well mimics the U.S. business cycle over the sample period. The model
also does well in terms of reproducing the strong procyclicality of the equity price.
The main findings of this paper are as follows. The equity price channel amplifies and prop-
agates shocks to the real economy through both financial accelerator and bank capital channels.
Equity plays a significant role in amplifying the financial accelerator effect on interest rates, infla-
tion and household loans. Due to the direct wealth effect, a negative equity price shock decreases
households’ consumption and, hence, output. The equity price channel weakens the counter-
cyclicality of bank capital-asset ratios, which reflects the increasing emphasis on common equity
capital in Basel regulations. This is beneficial in terms of financial stability, but amplifies and
propagates shocks to the real economy.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 defines the equity price channel. Sec-
tion 2.3 develops the New-Keynesian DSGE model with financial frictions and the equity price
channel. Section 2.4 presents the Bayesian estimation results. Section 2.5 discusses the role of the
equity price channel in business cycle fluctuations, performs the robustness analysis and reports
the cyclical properties of the equity price. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 The equity price channel in business cycles
The nexus of the equity price channel in the model economy is as follows. Equity prices are
endogenously determined by the aggregation of buying and selling shares between market partic-
ipants. That is, households can adjust their portfolio (bank and entrepreneur) equity investment to
either liquidate shares to finance current consumption or increase their equity holdings for future
consumption. This is the direct wealth effect on consumption. As a result, the demand-side deter-
mination of equity prices will affect financial contracts between creditors and debtors. Specifically,
the extension of credit to households is based on their ability to service debt with wage income
and their financial wealth (equity investment), whereas entrepreneurs obtain loans based on their
market capitalization and their redeemable physical capital assets. Hence, the market value of
entrepreneur equity affects their ability to finance production with loans.
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Not only does the equity price channel affect real economic activity through the financial
accelerator channel, it also influences credit supply through bank capital requirements and bank
funding. Firstly, banks finance assets with deposits and bank capital (equity and retained earnings),
where bank equity capital functions as a shock-absorber for loan defaults or deficiencies. Secondly,
I adopt the quadratic adjustment cost structure from Gerali et al. (2010) as the core framework for
credit supply frictions in financial intermediation: a monopolistically competitive banking sector
with quadratic adjustment costs for the interbank and retail loan rates.
2.3 The model economy
The basic framework of the model is a medium-scale New Keynesian DSGE model, in which a
monopolistically competitive retail goods sector introduces Calvo-type sticky prices. For simplic-
ity purposes, wages are flexible in the model. I augment the model with a heterogeneous banking
sector along the lines of Gerali et al. (2010). The model is closed by assuming that the monetary
authority follows a Taylor-type interest rate rule.
I introduce the equity price channel in the model as follows. Both borrower and saver house-
holds invest in the equity market, where equity serves, in part, as a measure of creditworthiness
for borrower households. Analogously the market value of the initial stock of entrepreneur equity
serves, in part, as a measure of net worth when entrepreneurs borrow bank loans. For banks, bank
capital is accumulated through previous bank capital, bank equity and retained earnings.
2.3.1 Households
There are two types of representative households, namely saver and borrower households. Both
























where the discount factor βtb < β
t
s. The coefficient of relative risk aversion γ
Γ measures the curva-
ture of the utility function with respect to its argument CΓt −φCΓt−1, where CΓt is real consumption
at time t and habit formation is parameterized by φ. η is the Frisch elasticity of labour supply with
respect to hours worked Ht. Households’ financial wealth is made up of deposits DΓt and equity
investments ΨΓt . Q
Ψ
t is the equity price at time t and ξψ,t is an exogenous demand shock on real
equity balances. Parameter a equals 0 for borrowers and 1 for savers. That is, only savers hold
deposits.6
6The assumption of liquidity services in the utility function can be traced back to Sidrauski (1967a,b). Similar to
Van den Heuvel (2008) and Christiano et al. (2010), I allow financial instruments (both deposits and equity) to provide
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2.3.2 Savers
Compared with borrowers, savers have a lower marginal propensity to consume, hold risk-free
deposits (a = 1), and do not borrow from banks at all. Savers allocate periodic income from
wages (Wt), deposits (Idt−1D
s




t−1) and dividends (Πψ,t) to current



















The dividend policy is characterized by periodic rebated profits from entrepreneurs and banks
to shareholders. For banks, dividend payments are endogenously determined, whereas for en-
trepreneurs the dividend policy follows rule defined as a proportion rψ (the steady-state net divi-
dend yield) of each household’s equity holdings.
Ψt = Ψst + Ψ
b
t is the total aggregate equity stock. The total aggregate equity stock equals the
total supply of equity from banks ΨBt and entrepreneurs Ψ
e
t , which is constant (i.e., no new equity
shares are issued). Therefore, in equilibrium Ψ ≡ ΨB + Ψe = Ψst + Ψbt .
The representative saver household’s first-order conditions for deposits, labour and equity
holdings are the following:
Pt
Dst






























where U sc,t = (C
s
t−φCst−1)−γ is the marginal utility of consumption and the Lagrangian multiplier
of the household’s budget constraint. Eq. 2.3 indicates that the demand for deposits depends on
households’ consumption and the real return to deposits. Eq. 2.4 gives the standard real wage
equation: the real wage equals the marginal rate of substitution of leisure for consumption. Eq. 2.5
gives the demand for equity holdings. Assuming no direct utility from equity holdings, the first















Borrowers do not invest in risk-free deposits (a = 0) and, instead, borrow bank loans to finance
their current consumption and investment in equity. Borrowers’ budget constraint is given by:
this service. As a result, this modeling device drives a wedge between the return on equity and the return on bank
deposits.
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Borrower households allocate periodic income from wages, capital gains/losses, dividends
and new loans (Lht ) to current consumption, new financial wealth holdings and the repayment of
previous loans (Iht−1L
h








t + (1− φw)(Qψt+1 + Πψ,t+1)Ψbt
]
. (2.8)
The representative borrower’s wage income together with her investment in the equity market
serve as a measure of creditworthiness, where 0 ≤ φw ≤ 1 is the weight on wage income. νh,t is
the stochastic loan-to-value ratio and, correspondingly, 1 − νh,t can be interpreted as the propor-
tional transaction cost for bank’s repossession of collateral assets in cases of borrower defaults.
Following the literature (eg. Iacoviello, 2005), I assume the size of shocks is small enough so that
the borrowing constraint is always binding.
The representative borrower household’s first-order conditions for labour, household loans and
equity holdings are the following:
(Hbt )




































where U bc,t and λ
h
t are the Lagrangian multipliers of the budget constraint and borrowing constraint,




t is the gross nominal return to equity. Eq. 2.9 is the
first-order condition for borrowers’ labour supply. Eq. 2.9 and Eq. 2.4 give the aggregate labour
supply schedule. Eq. 2.10 is the borrower household consumption Euler equation. Eq. 2.11 gives
borrowers’ demand for equity holdings.
By introducing heterogeneity in households and equity holdings in the households’ utility
function, I am able to model the demand-side interplay in the equity market. Indeed, given the
assumption of a constant total stock of equity, the net effect of the realized demand for equity
holdings for different types of households is equivalent, |M Ψbt |=|M Ψst |.
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2.3.4 Retailers
The retail sector is characterized by monopolistically competitive branders and acts as a modelling
device to introduce Calvo-type sticky prices into the model (see, Bernanke et al., 1999; Iacoviello,
2005). Retailers purchase intermediate goods Yj,t from entrepreneurs at the wholesale price PWj,t
in a competitive market, and differentiate them at no cost into Yk,t. Each retailer sells with a
markup over PWj,t at price Pk,t, taking into account their individual demand curves from consumers.
Following Calvo (1983), I assume that the retailer can only adjust the retail price with probability








P ∗k,tYk,t+z − PWj,t+zXYk,t+z
]
(2.12)







where Λt,z is the consumption-based relevant discount factor. P ∗k,t denotes the price set by the
retailers, who are able to adjust the price in period t. Xt ≡ PtP Wt is the aggregate markup of the
retail price over the wholesale price. In steady-state, X = ε
p
(εp−1) , where ε
p is the steady-state
price elasticity of demand for intermediate good Yj,t.










+ (1− θR)(P ∗t )1−ε
p
t , (2.14)
where γp determines the degree of price indexation. Combining and linearizing Eq. 2.12 and
Eq. 2.14 gives the forward-looking Phillips Curve, where current inflation is positively related to
expected inflation and negatively related to the markup.
2.3.5 Entrepreneurs





where Kj,t−1 is physical capital, Hj,t is labour, and ξz,t is the technology.
In each period the representative entrepreneur chooses the desired amount of physical capital,






















Hj,t− (Kj,t− (1− δe)Kj,t−1)−Adjej,t−Πeψ,jt. (2.17)
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− δe)2 Kj,t−1(2δe) , (2.18)
where Vj,t is the investment used to accumulate capital and κv is the capital adjustment cost pa-
rameter. Πeψ,jt = (r
ψQψj,tΨ
e
j)/Pt is the real dividend paid out. I assume entrepreneurs are more
impatient than saver households (βte < β
t
s), as in Iacoviello (2005).
7




j,t ≤ νe,jt[φkQkj,t+1Kj,t + (1− φk)Qψj,t+1Ψej ], (2.19)
where Qkj,t is the nominal price of physical capital, νe,jt is the exogenous stochastic loan-to-value
ratio, and Iej,t is the gross nominal interest rate on entrepreneur bank loans (L
e
j,t). The value of





serve as a measure of creditworthiness, where φk ∈ [0, 1] is the weight on physical capital stock.














































where λej,t is the Lagrangian multiplier of the borrowing constraint. Eq. 2.20 is the standard labour
demand schedule. Eq. 2.22 is the investment schedule, indicating that the shadow price of capital
must equal the expected marginal product of capital plus the discounted expected shadow price
and capital adjustment costs.
2.3.6 Loan and deposit demand
Following Gerali et al. (2010), I adopt a Dixit-Stiglitz framework for the credit market. The
retail branch of bank j provides a basket of differentiated deposits (Dj,t) and loan contracts with
households (Lhj,t) and entrepreneurs (L
e




















7The usual binding constraint conditions apply (see Iacoviello, 2005, p. 743-4), while (1/Re−βe) > 0 must hold.
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where Dt = Dst ∀ j ∈ [0, 1]. εdt , εht and εet are the stochastic elasticities of substitution for
deposits, household loans and entrepreneur loans respectively. The interest rates are set by bank j.
When setting interest rates the stochastic elasticities influence the aggregate markups for deposits
and loans, which in turn, attenuate or exacerbate the pass-through effect of monetary policy.
2.3.7 Banking sector
The banking sector setup is along the lines of Gerali et al. (2010), in which there is a continuum
of monopolistically competitive commercial banks. Each bank j ∈ [0, 1] consists of a perfectly
competitive wholesale branch and two monopolistically competitive retail branches, namely a
loan branch and a deposit branch. Banks issue loans to households and entrepreneurs. Assets
(both household and entrepreneur loans) are funded by deposits and bank capital. Banks have the
market power to set interest rates subject to a quadratic cost.
I introduce the equity price channel into the banking sector in the following way: bank capi-
tal is accumulated through previous period bank capital, changes in market capitalization of bank
equity and retained earnings (see Eq. 2.27). The equity price channel therefore plays a key role in
determining credit supply through bank capital requirements and bank funding (i.e., the bank capi-
tal channel). For instance, a negative equity price shock worsens the capital-asset ratio. In order to
bring the capital-asset ratio back to the target, banks have to reduce credit extension. One way to
do this is to raise the cost of credit, resulting in a downward pressure on credit demand. Moreover,
the binding bank balance sheet automatically reduces the feasible supply of credit—equivalent to
a leftward shift in the credit supply schedule which, in turn, adversely affects household consump-
tion and entrepreneur production.
It is worth noting that in the model developed here, bank deposits are not only one form of
financial wealth for households, but also one form of bank funds on the liability side of banks’
balance sheets. Therefore, changes in deposits affect households’ utility and banks’ ability to
extend credit.
Wholesale branch
The mandate of the wholesale branch is to manage the consolidated balance sheet of bank j.
The movement of funds between the branches of bank j are as follows. The wholesale branch
accepts deposits from the retail deposit branch at the wholesale deposit rate idt . The retail loan
branch receives wholesale loans and remunerates the wholesale branch at ilt. The wholesale branch
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subject to the binding balance sheet identity
Lt = KBt + Dt, (2.26)
where KBt is the total bank capital. The coefficient κk captures the quadratic adjustment cost of the
deviation of the current capital-to-asset ratio (KBt /Lt) from a target minimum capital requirement
ratio (τ), according to the Basel regulations.
The bank capital accumulation equation is as follows:
KBt = (1− δB)KBt−1 + φB(Qψt −Qψt−1)ΨB + (1− φψ)ωB,t−1, (2.27)
where, analogous to entrepreneurs, the initial stock of bank equity (ΨB) remains unchanged. What
matters here is the market capitalization of bank equity (Qψt Ψ
B). The higher the market capital-
ization of bank equity is, the more bank capital will be accumulated and, in turn, the more credit
banks will be able to supply. φB measures the pass-through effect of equity price changes on total
bank capital. Retained earnings are the consolidated profits (ωB,t−1 ) of bank j net of dividend
payments, where φψ is the share of bank profits paid out as dividends to households. δB captures
sunk costs for bank capital management.
Combining the first-order conditions for loans and deposits gives the spread between the com-













The banking sector is closed by assuming that wholesale branches have access to unlimited
funds from the central bank at the policy rate it. Arbitrage in the interbank market will then drive
the wholesale deposit rate idt towards it.
Retail branches
The retail loan branch of bank j differentiates wholesale loans Lt at zero cost. These loans
are then sold to households and entrepreneurs at their individual rates. The coefficients κh and κe
capture the quadratic adjustment costs for household and entrepreneur loan rates. The retail loan





































subject to demand schedules (2.24), with Lht + L
e
t = Lt.
In the symmetric equilibrium (for all loan types indexed z = e, h and banks j ∈ [0, 1]), the
first-order conditions give the borrower households’ and entrepreneurs’ bank loan rates. The log-
linearized equation for the loan rate can be written as
îzt =
κz













εz − 1 + (1 + βB)κz . (2.30)
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Eq. 2.30 shows that loan rate setting depends on the stochastic markup, the past and expected
future loan rates, and the marginal cost of the loan branch (the wholesale loan rate îlt), which
depends on the policy rate and the balance sheet position of the bank.8
The log-linearized equation for the deposit rate is
îdt =
κd








1− εd + (1 + βB)κd ît. (2.31)
With flexible interest rates, Eq. 2.31 implies îdt = ît. Gerali et al. (2010) show that the deposit rate
is a markdown of the policy rate. However, based on the inspection of U.S. deposit rate data over
the sample period 1982Q01−2012Q01, I find an aggregate steady-state markup of 0.16 percentage
points over the federal funds rate. This implies that the retail deposit branch is indeed making a
negligible loss based on the model’s setup.
2.3.8 Monetary policy and market clearing conditions









where κi is the weight on the lagged policy rate, κπ is the weight on inflation (Πt), and κy is the
weight on output growth. ξi,t is the monetary policy shock following an AR(1) stochastic process.
The aggregate resource constraint for the economy is




where Ct = Cst +C
b
t is aggregate consumption. In the equity market, as discussed in Section 2.3.2,
Ψ ≡ ΨB + Ψe = Ψst + Ψbt . The usual market aggregation applies for loans (Lt = Lht + Let ) and
labour (Ht = Hst + H
b
t ).
In a symmetric equilibrium, all entrepreneurs and bank retail branches make identical deci-
sions, so that Yj,t = Yt, Kj,t = Kt, Hj,t = Ht, Vj,t = Vt, Pj,t = Pt, Qkj,t = Q
k







t for j ∈ [0,1] and t = 0, 1, 2 ....
2.4 Estimation
The model is estimated with Bayesian techniques using U.S. data over the sample period 1982Q01
−2012Q01.9 Since the model has a total of nine shocks, the data set contains nine observable vari-
ables: output, inflation (GDP deflator), equity price, household loans, entrepreneur loans, deposits,




9The estimation is done using Dynare, developed by Michel Juillard and his collaborators at CEPREMAP.
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Table 2.1: Calibrated parameters
Parameter Description Value
βs Discount factor for saver households 0.99
βb Discount factor for borrower households 0.96
βe Discount factor for entrepreneurs 0.95
η Inverse of the Frisch elasticity 1
α Capital share in the production function 0.33
δe Capital depreciation rate 0.025
κv Capital installation costs 2
εp Price elasticity of demand for goods 11
Rψ Steady-state gross dividend yield 1.026
εe Elasticity of substitution for entrepreneur loans 1.352
εh Elasticity of substitution for household loans 1.436
τ Capital requirement ratio 0.11
δB Sunk costs for bank capital management 0.4
φψ Share of bank profits paid out in dividends 0.68
Lh/L Households’ share of total loans 0.45
Le/L Entrepreneurs’ share of total loans 0.55
L/Y Total loans-output ratio 1.5
C/Y Consumption-output ratio 0.679
QψΨ/Y Total equity-output ratio 0.849
Note: Bank and retailer discount factors are equal to the saver
household discount factor.
the Fed funds rate, the mortgage rate, and the Baa corporate rate. All variables except inflation
and interest rates are converted in real terms using the GDP deflator. I take the log-difference of
real variables prior to estimation.
2.4.1 Calibrated parameters
Table 2.1 lists the parameters that are calibrated prior to estimation. In the first block, the discount
factor for saver households (βs) is the reciprocal of the benchmark steady-state rate (R = 1.01).
To guarantee that the borrowing constraints are binding, the discount factors for borrower house-
holds (βb) and entrepreneurs (βe) are calibrated to 0.96 and 0.95, respectively. As in Gerali et al.
(2010), I assume that the bank’s discount factor (βB) and the retailer’s discount factor (βR) equal
βs. The inverse of the Frisch elasticity (η) is set to 1. The capital-output share α is set to 0.33,
and the physical capital depreciation rate δe is set to 0.025. The parameter governing capital in-
stallation costs (κv) is set to 2 (see, for example, Iacoviello, 2005). A steady-state gross markup
of X = 1.10 implies a price elasticity of demand for retail goods of εp = 11. The steady-state
return to equity is calibrated from S&P500 dividend yield data (see, Shiller, 2005, updated).
The second block in Table 2.1 reports the relevant conditions of the U.S. banking sector and the
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steady-state ratios of the main aggregates. The elasticities of substitution for entrepreneur loans
(εe) and household loans (εh) equal 1.352 and 1.436 respectively. The target capital requirement
ratio τ equals 11%, reflecting the recent U.S. commercial banks’ balance sheet condition. Based on
Eq. 2.27, δB equates with the steady-state ratio of retained earnings to bank capital over the sample
period 1982−2012 (FDIC, 2012). From 1982 to 2012, the average dividend to net income ratio
for all U.S. commercial banks φψ = 0.68 (FDIC, 2012). Shares of household and entrepreneur
loans to total bank loans, the total loans-output ratio, the consumption-output ratio, and the equity-
output ratio are calculated using the data means over the sample period. I restrict any other steady-
state ratios in the banking sector to be consistent with the balance sheet identity and the capital
requirement.
2.4.2 Prior distributions and posterior estimates
The prior distributions of the structural parameters are reported in columns 3-5 in Tables 2.2 and
2.3. I assume that the coefficients of relative risk aversion (RRA) for savers and borrowers {γs, γb}
follow an inverse-gamma distribution with a mean of 3 and a standard deviation of 0.5. The prior
on habit formation parameter φ is set at 0.5 with a standard deviation of 0.1. Prior means and
standard deviations of the parameters in the Phillips Curve and the monetary policy rule are based
on the estimates from Smets and Wouters (2007) and Christiano et al. (2010). The interest rate
adjustment cost parameters {κk, κh, κe} are assumed to follow a gamma distribution with a mean
of 4 and a standard deviation of 2 (see also, Gerali et al., 2010). Based on recent data from
the Federal Housing Finance Board, I choose a reasonable value of 0.75 as the prior mean for
households’ LTV (νh) and a more modest prior mean of 0.55 for entrepreneurs’ LTV (νe) (see
also, Gerali et al., 2010; Iacoviello and Neri, 2010). The weight on wages (φw) in the household
borrowing constraint is set to 0.5 with a standard deviation of 0.05. This implies that the amount
households can borrow depends equally on their wage income and on the market value of their
equity holdings. A relatively higher weight on physical capital assets (φk = 0.8) is imposed in the
entrepreneur borrowing constraint. The prior mean of φB is set to 0.35 with a standard deviation
of 0.05. Lastly, the prior distributions for the AR(1) coefficients and the standard deviations of the
shocks are reported in columns 3-5 in Table 2.3.
The estimated posterior means and standard deviations for the structural parameters are re-
ported in columns 6-9 in Tables 2.2 and 2.3. The estimated relative risk aversion coefficient for
saver households (4.21) is higher than that for borrower households (2.69). This implies that
saver households are less sensitive to financial market conditions and have a stronger preference
for smoothing their lifetime consumption. The estimated consumption habit formation parameter
(φ = 0.75) is consistent with those in the literature (e.g., Uhlig, 2007; Christiano et al., 2010).
The estimated parameters for price-setting and the monetary policy rule all conform well to the
literature.
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Table 2.2: Structural parameters
Prior distribution Posterior distribution
Parameter Type Mean Std.dev Mean 2.5% Median 97.5%
Preferences
γs Saver RRA Inv.Gamma 3 0.5 4.21 3.08 4.17 5.27
γb Borrower RRA Inv.Gamma 3 0.5 2.69 2.06 2.64 3.27
φ Habit formation Beta 0.5 0.1 0.75 0.70 0.75 0.79
Prices and wages
θR Price stickiness Beta 0.7 0.05 0.86 0.84 0.86 0.88
γp Degree of price indexation Beta 0.5 0.05 0.62 0.54 0.62 0.70
Monetary policy rule
κi Coefficient on lagged policy rate Beta 0.5 0.05 0.49 0.42 0.49 0.56
κπ Coefficient on inflation Gamma 2 0.05 2.07 1.99 2.07 2.16
κy Coefficient on output change Beta 0.25 0.05 0.25 0.18 0.25 0.33
Credit and banking
κh HH loan rate adjust. cost Gamma 4 2 3.59 1.58 3.40 5.84
κe Entrep. loan rate adjust. cost Gamma 4 2 0.87 0.45 0.83 1.23
κk Leverage deviation cost Gamma 4 2 9.11 6.44 8.93 12.1
νh Households’ LTV ratio Beta 0.75 0.05 0.73 0.64 0.73 0.80
νe Entrepreneurs’ LTV ratio Beta 0.55 0.05 0.51 0.42 0.51 0.60
φw Weight on wages Beta 0.5 0.05 0.43 0.38 0.43 0.48
φk Weight on phys. capital Beta 0.8 0.05 0.91 0.87 0.91 0.94
φB Equity price pass-through beta 0.35 0.05 0.35 0.28 0.35 0.42
The estimated parameter capturing the entrepreneur loan rate adjustment cost (0.87) is smaller
than that of the household loan rate adjustment cost (3.59), reflecting more frequent adjustments
of the Baa corporate rate to the changes in credit market condition, compared to that of the mort-
gage rate. Interestingly, both estimates in this paper for the U.S. economy are lower than those
in Gerali et al. (2010) for the Euro area. The estimated parameter measuring the cost of devi-
ating from targeted leverage is 9.11. The estimated LTV ratio for entrepreneurs (0.51) is lower
than that of households (0.73), which suggests that households can more easily collateralize their
loans. In fact, high estimates for νh and νe imply that changes to household creditworthiness and
entrepreneur net worth have strong effects on aggregate demand and output. An estimated pass-
through of equity price changes on bank capital accumulation φB = 0.35 implies that, ceteris
paribus, a 1% decrease in the equity price leads to a 0.35% decline in bank equity capital.
2.5 Results
In this section, I first assess the baseline New-Keynesian DSGE model with the equity price chan-
nel (BEP hereafter) by examining the dynamics of the model in response to a technology shock,
a monetary policy shock, an equity price shock and a price markup shock. The main focus here
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Table 2.3: Exogenous processes
Prior distribution Posterior distribution
Parameter Type Mean Std.dev Mean 2.5% Median 97.5%
AR(1) coefficients
ρz Technology beta 0.5 0.1 0.975 0.964 0.976 0.985
ρi Monetary policy beta 0.5 0.1 0.487 0.402 0.489 0.567
ρd Deposit beta 0.5 0.1 0.977 0.961 0.978 0.991
ρe Entrep. loan markup beta 0.5 0.1 0.672 0.598 0.677 0.746
ρh Household loan markup beta 0.5 0.1 0.558 0.451 0.555 0.675
ρνh Households’ LTV beta 0.5 0.1 0.922 0.892 0.922 0.951
ρνe Entrepreneurs’ LTV beta 0.5 0.1 0.972 0.957 0.973 0.988
ρψ Equity beta 0.5 0.1 0.938 0.921 0.938 0.953
ρp Price markup beta 0.5 0.1 0.584 0.495 0.589 0.666
Standard deviations
εz Technology Inv.Gamma 0.01 inf 0.024 0.019 0.023 0.028
εi Monetary policy Inv.Gamma 0.01 inf 0.009 0.008 0.009 0.011
εd Deposit Inv.Gamma 0.01 inf 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.008
εe Entrep. loan markup Inv.Gamma 0.01 inf 0.006 0.004 0.005 0.007
εh Household loan markup Inv.Gamma 0.01 inf 0.014 0.007 0.014 0.021
ενh Households’ LTV Inv.Gamma 0.01 inf 0.012 0.010 0.012 0.013
ενe Entrepreneurs’ LTV Inv.Gamma 0.01 inf 0.013 0.011 0.013 0.015
εψ Equity Inv.Gamma 0.01 inf 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.004
εp Price markup Inv.Gamma 0.01 inf 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
is on how the equity price channel affects the business cycle through the direct wealth effect on
consumption, the financial accelerator channel and the bank capital channel. I then study the role
of equity in borrower creditworthiness and bank capital accumulation. Finally, in order to com-
plement the quantitative analysis, I carry out the robustness analysis for the model, and report the
cyclical properties of the equity price.
In order to draw more valuable insights from the model, I compare the BEP model with two
alternative versions of the model: the model without the equity price channel (NEP hereafter) and
the flexible interest rate model (FI hereafter). For the NEP model, the equity market is taken out
of the model completely. That is, equity assets are no longer part of households’ financial wealth
and no longer serve as a measure of creditworthiness for borrower households and entrepreneurs.
In addition, bank equity is not being used to accumulate bank capital. For the FI model, there are
no quadratic interest rate adjustment costs, i.e. κh = κe = 0.
2.5.1 The equity price channel
As shown in Figures 2.4 and 2.5, it is clear that the equity price channel amplifies and propa-
gates shocks to the real economy through both financial accelerator and bank capital channels.10
10Figure 2.4 reports the impulse responses of output, policy rate, equity price and inflation to each shock listed from
column one to four, whereas Figure 2.5 reports the impulse responses of the banking sector variables. As the impulse
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Baseline (BEP) No equity (NEP) Flexible rates (FI)
Figure 2.4: Impulse responses for the main macroeconomic aggregates
In response to a positive technology shock, the equity price rises. On the one hand, a bullish
equity market increases the creditworthiness of borrower households and entrepreneurs and, in
turn, increases credit demand (the financial accelerator channel). On the other hand, banks are
able to meet the increase in credit demand because the bullish equity market raises bank capital
and, hence, the feasible quantity of credit supply (the bank capital channel). The upward shift
of the credit demand and supply schedules increases total loans, which stimulates entrepreneurs’
investment in production activities and allows households to increase their current consumption.
The equity price channel weakens the counter-cyclicality of the capital-asset ratio. The tech-
nology shock produces a counter-cyclical capital-asset ratio for the U.S. economy (see also, Meh
and Moran, 2010). As the capital-asset ratio falls below the capital requirement over-leveraged
banks put upward pressure on retail loan rates, which raises the cost of credit and, at the same time,
increases the profitability of the marginal loan (that is, a widening of credit spreads). Banks there-
fore adjust their capital-asset ratios back to the regulatory requirement, dampening the credit ex-
pansion. Including common equity in bank capital accumulation weakens the counter-cyclicality
responses of household loans are qualitatively similar to those of entrepreneur loans, I report the results for entrepreneur
loans only.
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Baseline (BEP) No equity (NEP) Flexible rates (FI)
Figure 2.5: Impulse responses for the banking sector variables
of the capital-asset ratio (BEP versus NEP, first row in Figure 2.5). This reflects the increasing em-
phasis on common equity capital in Basel regulations, whereby equity serves as a shock absorber
for capital deficiencies. The equity price channel is therefore beneficial in terms of financial sta-
bility, but amplifies and propagates shocks to the real economy.
Similarly, the dynamics of the model in response to a negative equity price shock mimics that
of a negative technology shock (see also, Castelnuovo and Nisticò, 2010). Due to the direct wealth
effect, a negative equity price shock decreases households’ consumption and, hence, output. The
deterioration of banks and borrowers’ balance sheets exacerbates the decline in real economic
activity. As a result, the decline in both output and inflation leads to a reduction of the policy
rate. But, at the same time, the decline in the value of common equity reduces bank capital, which
causes banks to become over-leveraged. A decrease in the capital-asset ratio therefore drives a
positive wedge between long-term retail loan rates and the policy rate—as a result, the attempt to
reduce the cost of credit is curtailed.
For a positive monetary policy shock and price markup shock, we observe similar dynamics
for the real economy: a decline in output. Moreover, the decline in output is greater with the BEP
model than that with the NEP model. For the credit market, on the demand side, the equity price
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channel significantly influences the creditworthiness of borrowers. On the supply side, equity price
movements have a strong influence on bank funding through bank equity capital. As a result, the
equity price channel amplifies and propagates shocks to bank loans: the decrease in entrepreneur
loans is more severe with the BEP model than that with the NEP model.
2.5.2 The role of equity in borrower creditworthiness and bank capital
accumulation
In this section I investigate the role of equity in borrower creditworthiness and bank capital accu-
mulation. To do so, I estimate and compare two alternative models to the baseline BEP model. In
the first alternative model (ALT1 hereafter) I take equity out of the household’s and entrepreneur’s
borrowing constraints (i.e., φk = φw = 1). In the second alternative model (ALT2 hereafter) there
is no equity in bank capital accumulation (i.e., φB = 0). Figure 2.6 displays the estimated impulse
response to a negative equity price shock for ALT1, ALT2 and BEP models.
Based on the results, we can conclude that the equity price channel amplifies and propagates
the shock to the real economy mainly through the bank capital channel: the responses of output
with the ALT1 and BEP models are qualitatively and quantitatively the same, and are stronger
than that with the ALT2 model, in which equity plays no role in bank capital accumulation. This
conclusion is supported by the results for both entrepreneur and household loans: their decline in
response to the shock with the BEP model is larger than that with the ALT2 model. Without equity
in bank capital accumulation, the response of loan rates is much stronger than that with the BEP
model. As a result, there is a less severe decline in bank loans.
Equity plays a critical role in determining the impact of a negative equity price shock on the
capital-asset ratio through the bank capital channel. Without equity in bank capital accumulation
(in ALT2), the capital-asset ratio increases in response to a negative equity price shock, as opposed
to a decline with the ALT1 and BEP models. This is because a decrease in equity prices results in
a decline in bank assets through the role of equity in borrower creditworthiness, while the shock
does not have a direct impact on bank capital. In order to bring the capital-asset ratio back to its
target, banks have to adjust loan rates more heavily than otherwise (ALT2 versus BEP). The same
applies to the monetary authority in adjusting the policy rate in response to the shock. Compared
to the ALT2 model, the opposite responses of policy and loan rates with the ALT1 model are due
to both the increase in inflation and the decline in the capital-asset ratio.
Equity plays a significant role in borrower creditworthiness in affecting interest rates and in-
flation. In other words, the equity price channel amplifies and propagates the shock to the policy
rate, both loan rates and inflation mainly through the financial accelerator channel. It is worth
noting that, compared to entrepreneur loans, equity plays a more significant role in amplifying the
financial accelerator effect on household loans. This is due to the estimated weight on equity as-
sets in the household’s borrowing constraint, which is much higher than that in the entrepreneur’s
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Figure 2.6: Impulse response to a negative equity price shock
borrowing constraint.11
To provide an additional frame of reference, I estimate a vector autoregression (VAR) with
the same data set and sample period used in the DSGE model estimation.12 Figure 2.7 displays
the VAR impulse responses to a negative equity price shock. The responses of output, interest
rates and loans from the estimated BEP model are all quantitatively and qualitatively similar to
those from the estimated VAR. A few points are worth noting here. Firstly, in response to a
negative equity price shock, the contraction of loans to households and entrepreneurs reflects an
important role of equity in borrower creditworthiness. Secondly, the strong positive correlation
between output and equity prices highlights the direct financial wealth effect on consumption and,
hence, output. Thirdly, the impulse responses of deposits from the estimated DSGE models are
inconsistent with that from the estimated VAR. Neither the BEP model nor the two alternative
models capture the initial substitution effect between deposits and equity.13 This is because, in
the DSGE model setup, the binding bank balance sheet identity constrains the substitutability of
11See Table 2.2.
12The VAR contains two lags of each variable.
13That is, in response to a collapse in equity prices, households initially shift from equity assets to risk-free deposit
holdings.
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Figure 2.7: VAR impulse response to a negative equity price shock
equity assets with deposit holdings.
2.5.3 Robustness analysis
To perform the robustness analysis, I compare the posterior estimates of the parameters of the
BEP, NEP and FI models. Overall, as reported in Table 2.4, most of the parameter estimates are
consistent across models. Some interesting points are worth noting here. The estimated relative
risk aversion coefficients for both borrowers and savers for the BEP model are greater than those
for the NEP model. This reflects the fact that households are more risk averse if they invest in the
equity market. As argued by Cochrane (2008), a high degree of risk aversion is needed to explain
the high risk premium. The estimated κk for the NEP model is 5.27, whereas the estimate is 9.11
for the BEP model. This decline in the capital adjustment cost parameter in the NEP model reflects
the significance of the equity price channel on bank capital. The same is observed in the FI model.
The estimated LTV ratios for entrepreneurs (νe) and households (νh) are consist with the findings
in the literature, and vary slightly across the models.
The dynamics of the model reported in Section 2.5.1 also shows that the model developed
here (BEP) is robust. Overall, the BEP model with the equity price channel performs well. The
responses of the main macroeconomic variables to each of the shocks are intuitive, and conform
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Table 2.4: Alternative model estimated parameter comparisons
Posterior distribution means Posterior distribution means
Benchmark No equity Flexible rates Benchmark No equity Flexible rates
BEP NEP FI BEP NEP FI
Parameters AR(1) processes
γs 4.215 3.881 3.349 ρz 0.975 0.976 0.952
γb 2.691 2.000 2.458 ρi 0.487 0.463 0.464
φ 0.746 0.707 0.693 ρd 0.977 0.935 0.946
θR 0.861 0.819 0.867 ρe 0.672 0.451 0.724
γp 0.623 0.691 0.644 ρh 0.558 0.533 0.747
κi 0.493 0.496 0.446 ρνh 0.922 0.928 0.905
κπ 2.071 2.088 2.082 ρνe 0.972 0.935 0.936
κy 0.253 0.247 0.260 ρψ 0.938 - 0.899
κh 3.592 3.617 - ρp 0.584 0.545 0.533
κe 0.869 2.939 - εz 0.024 0.016 0.019
κk 9.111 5.274 4.095 εi 0.009 0.010 0.010
νh 0.728 0.739 0.781 εd 0.007 0.008 0.008
νe 0.508 0.295 0.526 εe 0.006 0.013 0.003
φw 0.428 - 0.430 εh 0.014 0.014 0.003
φk 0.907 - 0.897 ενh 0.012 0.022 0.010
φB 0.352 - 0.228 ενe 0.013 0.008 0.012
εψ 0.003 - 0.004
εp 0.001 0.001 0.001
Note: I exclude parameter descriptions, prior means and standard deviations, and statistical
confidence intervals in the table, due to the limited space. (see Tables 2.2 and 2.3)
to the findings in the literature (eg. Castelnuovo and Nisticò, 2010).
2.5.4 Cyclical properties of the equity price channel
This section studies the cyclical properties of equity price. First, I compare the standard deviations
of a variable, σ(X), relative to that of output from the data and those from the model. Thereafter,
I compare correlations of equity price with interested variables from the data and those from the
model.
Panel A in Table 2.5 reports the results for the U.S. data. Over the sample period 1982Q01−
2012Q01, equity prices are nine times as volatile as output, while investment and bank capital
are four and two times as volatile. The relative variation of consumption to output is slightly less
than one. Equity prices are persistent at one-step and two-step autocorrelations, and are positively
correlated with all the variables. In addition, equity prices tend to be a leading indicator of the
other variables.
Panel B reports the results from the model. Firstly, the generated volatilities of the variables
are consistent with those from the data. Secondly, for all the variables the model replicates the
strong positive correlation with equity price observed from the U.S. data.
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 2. THE EQUITY PRICE CHANNEL 28
Table 2.5: Cyclical properties of equity price
Variable σ(X)
σ(Y )
Correlation of equity price with
Xt−2 Xt−1 Xt Xt+1 Xt+2
Panel A: U.S. data
Equity price 9.29 0.59 0.83 1 0.83 0.59
Consumption 0.79 0.28 0.42 0.57 0.60 0.56
Investment 4.04 0.21 0.33 0.47 0.57 0.61
Bank Capital 2.01 0.23 0.15 0.31 0.37 0.38
GDP 1 0.27 0.41 0.55 0.61 0.56
Panel B: Model economy
Equity price (Qψt ) 6.87 0.87 0.94 1 0.94 0.87
Consumption (Ct) 1.14 0.68 0.75 0.82 0.80 0.77
Investment (Vt) 2.64 0.42 0.45 0.48 0.48 0.49
Bank Capital (KBt ) 1.43 0.46 0.56 0.66 0.61 0.58
Output (Yt) 1 0.68 0.76 0.83 0.82 0.79
Notes: For the U.S. data, all series are detrended using the HP filter. For the
model, I use the smoothed variables predicted from the posterior estimates.
Equity price and output are observable variables in estimation though.
Overall, the model does well in terms of reproducing the strong procyclicality of the equity
market. Furthermore, for both the data and the model equity price is shown to be a leading indi-
cator of the other variables. These results reaffirm the relevance of the equity price channel in a
general equilibrium model.
2.6 Concluding remarks
This paper highlights the equity price channel as a different aspect to general equilibrium mod-
els with financial frictions. Indeed, as with other general equilibrium models in the literature,
the model developed here lacks a comprehensive description of complex stock price dynamics.
Rather, the focus here is on the implication of introducing the equity price channel into a general
equilibrium model: how the equity price channel affects consumption, production and banking
activities. I show that a New-Keynesian DSGE model with an equity price channel reproduces the
U.S. business cycle well. The model also does well in terms of reproducing the strong procycli-
cality of the equity market.
The equity price channel amplifies and propagates shocks to the real economy through both
the financial accelerator channel and the bank capital channel. Equity plays a significant role in
amplifying the financial accelerator effect on interest rates, inflation and household loans. Due
to the direct wealth effect, a negative equity price shock decreases households’ consumption and,
hence, output. The equity price channel weakens the counter-cyclicality of bank capital-asset
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ratios. Equity serves as a shock absorber for capital deficiencies, which reflects the increasing
emphasis on common equity capital in Basel regulations. This is beneficial in terms of financial
stability, but amplifies and propagates shocks to the real economy.
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Chapter 3
Credit spread variability in U.S.
business cycles: the Great Moderation
versus the Great Recession
3.1 Introduction
The objective of this paper is to establish the prevailing financial factors that influence credit
spread variability, and the mechanisms through which shocks impact credit spread variability over
the Great Moderation and Great Recession periods. I specifically look at demand- and supply-
side credit market frictions, the equity market and bank balance sheet adjustments. Furthermore,
I investigate whether there are any contributing financial factors to credit spread variability in the
recent 2007−09 Great Recession that can be distinguished from the 1990−91 and 2001 recessions
during the Great Moderation. By answering these questions we gain insight into the key financial
factors that propagate and amplify financial stress to the real economy.
One notable recurring characteristic of financial stress in recessions is the widening of credit
spreads. Since the financial crisis reared its head in August 2007, systemic disruptions to financial
intermediation have shown how large variations in credit spreads dislocate the interaction between
short-term interest rates and real economic activity. The recent crisis has also called into question
the lack of a prominent role for financial intermediation and multiple interest rates in dynamic
macroeconomic models, and subsequently, the effectiveness of the interest-rate policy of central
banks (Woodford, 2010; Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2011). Similarly, the role of the equity market
cannot be ignored. As pointed out by Brunnermeier (2009) and Adrian and Shin (2011), both
credit spreads and equity markets exhibited significant financial stress during the Great Recession
of 2007−09, and both significantly affected real economic activity and the business cycle (see,
Castelnuovo and Nisticò, 2010; Gilchrist and Zakrajšek, 2012). In fact, the 1990−91 and 2001
recessions during the Great Moderation exhibited similar financial stress through widening credit
spreads and collapsing equity prices. Farmer (2012b) goes further and argues that it is the stock
30
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Figure 3.1: Financial markets and the U.S. business cycle
market crash of 2008, triggered by a collapse in house prices, that caused the Great Recession.
Collapsing equity prices and widening credit spreads tend to occur at the same time. To illus-
trate the behaviour of credit spread variability and equity prices, Figure 3.1 plots the logarithm of
the S&P500, two retail credit spreads (the difference of the mortgage loan rate and the 3-month
Treasury Bill rate and the difference of the Baa corporate bond rate and the 3-month Treasury
Bill rate) and the interbank credit spread (the difference of the interbank rate and the 3-month
Treasury Bill rate).1 Two observations are worth noting here. Firstly, the recessions (grey ar-
eas) of 1990−91, 2001 and 2007−09 coincided with equity price collapses (from recession peak
to S&P500 trough) of 14.7% (1990−91), 11.91% (2001) and 48.82% (2007−09), respectively.2
Secondly, significant credit spread widening occurred during all three recession periods.
Equity plays an important role in bank capital accumulation too. Figure 3.2 shows the compo-
sition of bank capital over the sample period of 1982−2012.3 Over the period 1982Q2−2003Q4
the total bank capital structure of all commercial banks in the U.S. consistently comprised of, ap-
proximately, 55% equity capital stock and 45% retained earnings.4 However, since 2003Q4 the
ratios diverged considerably, with equity surplus peaking at 77.3% and retained earnings declin-
1Data source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’s FRED database. See Section 3.4 for the definition of the
interbank rate.
2The total equity price collapses were: 14.78% (Jun ’90−Oct ’90), 29.68% (Aug ’00−Sept ’01), and 50.82% (Oct
’07−Mar ’09).
3Data source: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC, 2012).
4The commercial banking sector’s equity capital stock is calculated by summing the aggregate values of the pre-
ferred stock, the common stock at par, and the market value of the common equity surplus.
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Figure 3.2: Composition of bank capital for all U.S. commercial banks
ing to 18.7% by the end of 2009. This simple exercise shows a significant structural shift towards
greater common equity capital leverage in U.S. commercial banks.
A volume of research on financial factors emphasizes both credit demand- and supply-side
restrictions that exacerbate the business cycle. For example, creditworthiness and net worth con-
strain the borrowing ability of households and firms (Bernanke et al., 1999; Iacoviello, 2005),
while bank capital requirements, interest rate stickiness and value-at-risk constraints impose fric-
tions in financial intermediaries (Gerali et al., 2010; Adrian and Shin, 2011). Although demand-
side factors are important for financial accelerator effects, the consensus highlights the importance
of financial intermediaries in propagating financial instability to real economic activity—through
both the composition of balance sheet aggregates and the widening of credit spreads. Some stud-
ies focus on how to curtail the effects of credit market frictions or bank balance sheet adjustments
on real economic activity through either conventional or unconventional monetary policies. Cúr-
dia and Woodford (2010) use a basic New-Keynesian model with credit frictions and minimal
financial intermediary structures to investigate the interaction between credit spread variability
and monetary policy. Adrian and Shin (2011) and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2011) centralize the role
of financial intermediation in macroeconomic models to conform more closely to current institu-
tional realities. While these two studies successfully highlight potential causes and consequences
of the recent U.S. credit cycle, their frameworks have yet to be fully adapted to the New-Keynesian
framework. It is clear though, there have been significant changes in financial intermediation over
the last three decades. What is unclear is whether the transmission mechanism of financial in-
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termediation has evolved over the Great Moderation and Great Recession periods (Ireland, 2011,
p.52).
To understand the sources of credit spread variability, and the mechanisms through which they
impact credit spread variability, I develop a New-Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilib-
rium (DSGE) model with a central role for financial intermediation and equity markets. On the one
hand, the model captures how financial intermediaries adjust interest rates in response to their own
balance sheet adjustments and that of nonfinancial borrowers. This is along the lines of Bernanke
and Gertler (1995), in which the authors argue that the balance sheet channel (financial accelera-
tor channel) is one of the two important mechanisms through which monetary policy affects the
size of the external finance premium in credit markets and, hence, real economic activity.5 On
the other hand, the model reveals an important role for equity prices in affecting real economic
activity through the financial accelerator channel and the bank capital channel.
The contribution of the paper is two-fold. Firstly, it synthesizes recent milestones in the New-
Keynesian DSGE literature on financial intermediation (e.g., Cúrdia and Woodford, 2009; Gerali
et al., 2010) and the fundamental factors of the Great Recession in the U.S. economy (e.g., Ireland,
2011; Farmer, 2012b). That said, I present a centralized framework of financial intermediaries’
interest rate setting behaviour in the transmission of nominal, real and financial shocks. In terms
of the model setup, this paper contributes to the DSGE literature by introducing a role for the
equity market in households, firms and banks’ resource allocation. For the second contribution, I
investigate whether financial factors that affect credit spread variability and their behaviour have
fundamentally changed over the the Great Moderation and the Great Recession periods.
The results show that supply-side factors are the primary source of credit spread variability,
which is along the lines of Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012). That is, retail loan markups account for
more than half of the variability of retail credit spreads and sticky rate adjustments significantly
alter the path of retail loan rates relative to the policy rate. Monetary policy has a strong influence
on the short-term interbank rate, whereas the effectiveness of interest-rate policy on long-term
nonfinancial loan rates is much weaker. Equity prices exacerbate movements in credit spreads
through the financial accelerator channel, but cannot be regarded as a main driving force of credit
spread variability. Both the financial accelerator and bank capital channels play a significant role
in propagating the movements of credit spreads. In contrast to Ireland (2011), I observe a re-
markable decline in the influence of technology and monetary policy shocks over three recession
periods. From the demand-side of the credit market, the influence of LTV shocks has declined
since the 1990−91 recession, while the bank capital requirement shock exacerbates and prolongs
credit spread variability over the 2007−09 recession period. Moreover, across the three recession
periods, there is an increasing trend in the contribution of loan markup shocks to the variability of
retail credit spreads.
5The other mechanism is the bank lending channel.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 defines the credit spread trans-
mission mechanism of financial intermediation. Section 3.3 develops the New-Keynesian DSGE
model with financial market interactions, and Section 3.4 presents the Bayesian estimation results.
Sections 3.5.1 investigates financial factors that affect credit spread variability, and Section 3.5.2
compares the influence of financial factors on credit spread variability over the Great Moderation
and Great Recession periods. Section 3.5.3 provides a robustness analysis of the baseline model.
Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 The transmission mechanisms of credit spread variability
In this section I define the four transmission mechanisms of credit spread variability in the DSGE
model with credit and banking. On the supply side of the credit market we have bank market
power and bank balance sheet adjustments. On the demand side, we have the creditworthiness of
nonfinancial borrowers (the financial accelerator channel). The fourth transmission mechanism is
the equity price channel.
Credit supply factors fall under two types of banking operations. On the one hand, commercial
banks are monopolistically competitive, and supply long-term loans to nonfinancial borrowers
(households and entrepreneurs) in the retail market. Credit spread variability arises from interest-
rate stickiness and stochastic retail rate markups. This bank market power is the mechanism by
which long-term retail loan rates adjust disjointedly to short-term interest rates. Investment banks,
on the other hand, provide short-term funding to commercial banks in the interbank market, and
finance their interbank lending with deposits and bank capital.
In the interbank market, bank capital-asset requirements influence the adjustment of the effec-
tive interbank rate. Because investment bank assets are subject to a bank capital-asset requirement,
for a given quantity of bank capital, the supply schedule for interbank funds will be upward slop-
ing (Woodford, 2010, p.31-32). In contrast, the downward sloping demand schedule for interbank
funding depends on the quantity of available interbank funds at any given retail credit spread. The
intersection of the supply and demand schedules determines the equilibrium quantity of interbank
funds and the prevailing credit spreads. Shocks to bank funding (either deposits or bank capital)
therefore directly affect the supply of liquidity to nonfinancial borrowers. As a result, financial
intermediation in the interbank market and in the retail credit market has a direct impact on the
efficient allocation of resources in real economic activity (Woodford, 2010, p.29-35).
The financial accelerator channel captures the demand side transmission mechanism of credit
spread variability. Here, household creditworthiness and entrepreneur net worth influence the
external finance premium.6 That is, the ability of borrowers to collateralize their external financing
is inversely related to the cost of credit (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995, p.35). As a result, low net
6The external finance premium is the difference between the cost of external financing (equity or debt) and internal
financing (retained earnings).
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worth or collateral during recessions causes credit spreads to widen. Conversely, during boom
phases improved creditworthiness causes credit spreads to narrow.
I identify the equity price channel as a separate transmission mechanism in credit spread vari-
ability. The price of equity is determined by households’ demand for equity investment. To gen-
erate the strong correlation between equity prices and credit spreads (Figure 3.1) I provide a role
for equity in nonfinancial borrowers’ creditworthiness and bank capital. As a result, the equity
price channel influences credit spreads through both the financial accelerator channel and the bank
capital channel. For example, an equity price collapse reduces borrower creditworthiness which
puts upward pressure on retail credit spreads from the demand side. On the supply side, a fall in
the bank capital-asset ratio induces financial distress in over-leveraged banks, which widens the
interbank spread.
3.3 The model economy
To begin with, the credit spreads in this study are defined as follows. The spread between the
policy rate and the interbank rate is the interbank credit spread, whereas the spread between the
interbank rate and the long-term retail loan rate is the retail credit spread.7
Households borrow bank loans to finance their consumption, hold safe assets (e.g., bank de-
posits and government bonds), and invest in the equity market. Entrepreneurs demand homoge-
nous labour to produce wholesale goods. Monopolistically competitive branders in the retail goods
sector introduce Calvo-type sticky prices, whereas unions aggregate labour supply and introduce
the Calvo-type sticky wages in the model. The model is closed by assuming that the monetary
authority follows the conventional Taylor-type monetary policy rule.
3.3.1 Financial intermediation
There is a continuum of bank units, where each bank j ∈ [0, 1] consists of an investment bank
and a commercial bank. The commercial bank is assumed to be a wholly-owned subsidiary of
the investment bank, and the consolidated profits are used as retained earnings at the end of each
period (see, Gerali et al., 2010).
3.3.1.1 Investment Bank
The investment bank chooses household safe assets (Bt) and the amount of interbank lending to
commercial banks (Lct) to maximize periodic discounted cash-flows:
7In the literature, the net interest spread is the difference between the rates at which banks borrow and lend. Cúrdia
and Woodford (2009) refer to the net interest spread as the credit spread, while Adrian and Shin (2011, p.602) refer to
it as the term spread.
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subject to the binding balance sheet identity
Lct = K
B
t + Bt, (3.2)
where KBt is the total bank capital. The coefficient κk captures the quadratic adjustment cost of the
deviation of the current capital-assets ratio (KBt /L
c
t) from a target capital requirement ratio (τt),
according to the Basel regulations. τt follows an exogenous AR(1) process. This banking sector
setup allows for interbank credit spread variability emanating from capital-asset ratio adjustments
relative to exogenous innovations in τt. For example, when financial stress hits the interbank mar-
ket banks raise their desired capital requirement, which immediately raises the interbank spread.
As banks are accumulating larger capital buffers and the capital-asset ratio is converging towards
the target τt, the interbank credit spread becomes narrower.
The bank capital accumulation equation is as follows:
KBt = (1− δB)KBt−1 + φψ(Qψt −Qψt−1)ΨB + ΠBψ,t−1. (3.3)
I assume that the initial stock of bank equity (ΨB) remains unchanged. What matters here is the
market capitalization of bank equity (Qψt Ψ
B). As the market value of bank equity increases, bank
capital accumulates and, in turn, the feasible credit supply increases (i.e. a rightward shift of the
credit supply schedule). φψ measures the pass-through effect of equity price changes on total bank
capital. δB is the bank capital depreciation rate, capturing management costs for banks. Retained
earnings (ΠBψ,t−1) are bank profits net of dividend payments.
I assume no frictions between short-term safe asset classes, and the investment bank has access
to unlimited funds from the central bank at the policy rate it. Therefore, arbitrage implies that
investment banks remunerate household safe assets at it. Conversely, for the supply of interbank
funds, the commercial bank remunerates investment bank assets at ict . Combining the first order
conditions for Bt and Lct gives the interbank credit spread between the interbank loan rate and the
policy rate,











Commercial bank j differentiates Lcj,t at zero cost and sells them to households and entrepreneurs
at their individual markups. All commercial banks j ∈ [0, 1] apply a symmetrical objective func-
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I assume that the interbank market determines the feasible quantity of loans in the retail sector,




j,t (see also, Gerali et al., 2010; Woodford, 2010). Risk on





j,t. Where νB is the interbank loan-to-value ratio.
8
In the symmetric equilibrium the first order conditions give household and entrepreneur loan
rates. Under flexible interest rates (κz = 0) and no value-at-risk constraint, retail loan rates izt are





Subsequently, the retail rate markup over ict is defined as the retail credit spread. Therefore, for
each loan type z, the sum of the interbank credit spread and retail credit spread gives the net
interest spread (as in Cúrdia and Woodford (2009)) between izt and it.














(1− νB)(εz − 1)
κ∗z
µz,t, (3.7)
where µz,t is the stochastic process for retail rate markups imposed by commercial banks, and
κ∗z = (1 − νB)(εz − 1) + (1 + βB)κz . Eq. 3.7 shows that entrepreneur and household loan rate
setting depends on: the stochastic markup, past and expected future loan rates, and the marginal
cost of the loan branch (̂ict ) which depends on the policy rate and the balance sheet position of
the bank. Firstly, the stochastic markup moves independently from îct . As νB tends to one, the
influence of the interbank rate over retail rate setting increases, while the influence of the stochastic
markup decreases. In contrast, a higher adjustment cost (κz) smoothes the adjustment of retail loan
rates and, hence, retail credit spreads. Furthermore, a positive adjustment of the interbank rate puts
upward pressure on retail loan rates, yet the pass-through effect becomes smaller for higher values
of κz .
8See Woodford (2010, p.32) and Adrian and Shin (2011, p.608-9). Appendix C discusses the setup in more detail.
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3.3.2 Households
I adopt the conventional consumption-based asset pricing framework for equity. The demand
driven equity price is market determined by contemporaneous wealth effects on households’ in-
tertemporal consumption choices, capital gains (or losses) and dividend payments. Moreover,
equity is redeemable as collateral for bank loans.
The representative household derives utility from consumption and leisure choices, and finan-
cial wealth services in the form of safe assets (see also, Iacoviello, 2005; Christiano et al., 2010).















where βth is the discount factor. The coefficient of relative risk aversion γ measures the curvature
of the household’s utility function with respect to its argument Ct − φCt−1, where Ct is real
consumption at time t and habit formation is parameterized by φ. η is the Frisch elasticity of labour
supply with respect to hours worked (Ht). Households’ preferences are subject to a demand shock
ξb,t on real safe asset balances (Bt/Pt).

























The household allocates periodic wage income (WtHt), gross return on safe assets (It−1Bt−1),
capital gains/losses (Qψt Ψt−1), real dividends (Πψ,t) and new loans (L
h
t ) to current consumption,
new asset holdings and the repayment of previous loans (Iht−1L
h
t−1). ξψ,t is an equity price shock.
The dividend policy is defined as a proportion ζψ (the steady-state dividend yield) of the value of






φwWtHt + (1− φw)Qψt Ψt
]
. (3.10)
The household’s wage income together with her investment in the equity market serve as a measure
of creditworthiness, where 0 ≤ φw ≤ 1 is the weight on wage income. νh,t is a stochastic loan-to-
value ratio and, correspondingly, in cases of default 1− νh,t can be interpreted as the proportional
transaction cost for bank’s repossession of borrower’s collateral. Following the literature (e.g.,
Iacoviello, 2005), I assume the size of shocks is small enough so that the borrowing constraint is
always binding.
The representative household’s first order conditions for hours worked, household loans, safe
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assets and equity are as follows:
Wt
Pt

































− λt(Uc,t)−1νh,t(1− φw), (3.14)
where Uc,t = (Ct − φCt−1)−γ is the marginal utility of consumption and the Lagrangian mul-
tiplier of the household’s budget constraint. The Lagrangian multiplier λt is the marginal utility
of an additional unit of loans. Eq. 3.11 is the household’s labour supply schedule. Eq. 3.12 is
the consumption Euler equation. Eq. 3.13 indicates that the demand for assets depends on house-
holds’ consumption and the real return to safe assets (Rt), where Rt < Rht ∀ t.9 Eq. 3.14 gives
the consumption-based asset pricing equation for equity investment. Specifically, the resulting
equilibrium market price for equity incorporates demand-side wealth effects on consumption.
3.3.3 Retailers
The retail sector, characterized by monopolistically competitive branders, introduces Calvo-type
sticky prices into the model (see, Bernanke et al., 1999; Iacoviello, 2005). Retailers purchase
intermediate goods Yj,t from entrepreneurs at the wholesale price PWj,t in a competitive market,
and differentiate them at no cost into Yk,t. Each retailer sells Yk,t with a mark-up over PWj,t at
price Pk,t, taking into account their individual demand curves from consumers. Following Calvo
(1983), I assume that the retailer can only adjust the retail price with probability (1− θR) in each








P ∗k,tYk,t+z − PWj,t+zXYk,t+z
]
(3.15)







where Λt,z is the consumption-based relevant discount factor. P ∗k,t denotes the optimal sales price
set by the retailers, who are able to adjust the price in period t. Xt ≡ Pt/PWt is the aggregate
9Rht = I
h
t /Πt+1 is the real return on household loans.
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markup of the retail price over the wholesale price. In steady state, X = εp/(εp − 1), where εp is
the steady state price-elasticity of demand for intermediate good Yj,t.










t + (1− θR)(P ∗t )1−ε
p
t , (3.17)
where γp determines the degree of price indexation for non-optimizing retailers. Solving and
linearizing the optimization problem and combining it with Eq. 3.17 gives the forward-looking
New-Keynesian Phillips curve, as in the literature.
3.3.4 Entrepreneurs





where 0 < α < 1. Kj,t−1 is physical capital and ξz,t is an exogenous technology shock for total
factor productivity. The representative entrepreneur faces the following borrowing constraint
Iej,tL
e
j,t ≤ νe,jt[φkQkj,tKj,t−1 + (1− φk)Qψj,tΨej ], (3.19)
where φk ∈ (0, 1) is the weight on physical capital stock. Qkj,t is the nominal price of physical
capital, νe,jt is an exogenous stochastic loan-to-value ratio, and Iej,t is the gross nominal interest
rate on entrepreneur bank loans (Lej,t). The market value of physical capital (Q
k
j,tKj,t−1) and
the initial stock of entrepreneur equity (Qψj,tΨ
e
j) serve as a measure of creditworthiness.
10 The
equity market is introduced into the production sector in such a way that it has an impact on the
entrepreneur’s resource allocation and, in turn, the productivity of the economy.
Following Iacoviello (2005), I assume that in each period the representative entrepreneur










subject to the production technology (Eq. 3.18), borrowing constraint (Eq. 3.19) and the following














Hj,t + Vj,t + Adjej,t + Π
e
ψ,jt. (3.21)




− δe)2 Kj,t−1(2δe) , (3.22)
10In other words, they serve as a market-based signal for entrepreneurs’ net worth and hence collateral.
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where Vj,t is the investment used to accumulate capital, Kj,t = (1 − δe)Kj,t−1 + Vj,t, and κv is




j)/Pt is the real dividend paid
out. I assume entrepreneurs are more impatient than households (βte < β
t
h) and, therefore, γ
e
should be less than γ. Iacoviello (2005) adopts log utility (γe = 1) for entrepreneurs. This
implies that entrepreneurs are not risk neutral, but rather lie between being extremely risk averse
and risk neutral. Here, I add the risk aversion coefficient to capture the degree of impatience of
entrepreneurs, while the usual binding constraint conditions must hold (1/Ie − βe) > 0).













































where λej,t is the Lagrangian multiplier of the borrowing constraint. Eq. 3.25 is the investment




(Vj,t/Kj,t−1 − δe)). The investment schedule states that the shadow price of capital must equal
the expected marginal product of capital plus the discounted expected shadow price and capital
adjustment costs. Eq. 3.23 is the standard labour demand schedule. Eq. 3.24 gives the entrepreneur
consumption Euler equation.
3.3.5 Labour supply decisions and the wage-setting equation
The wage-setting equilibrium stems from the work of Gali et al. (2007). Monopolistically com-
petitive unions set the optimal wage at the prevailing labour demand equilibrium. There is a con-
tinuum of unions, each union represents workers of a certain type τ uniformly distributed across
all households.
The unions’ problem is to choose {W τt }∞t=0 to maximize the consumption-weighted wage
income of their workers. However, following Calvo (1983), in each time period only a random
fraction 1 − θw of unions have the opportunity to reset the optimal wage (W ∗t ) for its workers,
whereas those unions that cannot reset wages simply index to the lagged wage rate, as in Christiano










+ (1− θw)(W ∗t )1−ε
w
, (3.26)
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Here C̃t+i, defined as C̃t+i = (Ct+i−φCt+i−1)γ , captures households’ consumption preferences.

























where MRSt+i = C̃t+iH
η
t+i is the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure
for households and µw = εw/(εw − 1) is the steady-state wage markup.













Combining Eq. 3.27 with the log-linearized aggregate wage index (3.26) gives the aggregate
sticky wage equation
wt = Φwt−1 + ΦβhEtwt+1 + Φ∗(εwηwt + χmrst)
+ΦβhEtπt+1 − Φπt − Φθwβhγwπt + Φγwπt−1, (3.28)
where Φ∗ = (1− θw)(1− θwβh)/(1 + θ2wβh)(1 + εwη) and Φ = θw/(1 + θ2wβh).
3.3.6 Monetary policy and market clearing conditions









where κi is the weight on the lagged policy rate, κπ is the weight on inflation, and κy is the weight
on output growth. ξi,t is the monetary policy shock following an AR(1) stochastic process.
The market clearing conditions are as follows. The aggregate resource constraint for the econ-
omy is
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where δBKBt−1 represents the banks’ management cost in terms of bank capital. Similar to Ia-
coviello (2005), I close the model by including the entrepreneur flow of funds constraint (3.21).
In the equity market, the aggregate demand for equity shares across a continuum of households
implies that Ψt ≡ Ψ. Market clearing in the equity market therefore requires the assumption of a
constant total stock of equity shares in the whole economy. Given this assumption, entrepreneurs
and banks do not issue new shares and Ψe + Ψb = Ψ. The usual market clearing aggregation
applies for consumption and loans.
3.3.7 Exogenous shocks
In the model, there are ten exogenous shocks that follow AR(1) processes with independent and
identically distributed standard deviations. The three core New-Keynesian shocks are the tech-
nology shock (ξz,t), the price markup shock (ε
p
t ) and the monetary policy shock (ξ
i
t). I introduce
seven additional shocks in the financial sector. On the supply side of credit, there is a capital
requirement shock (τt) in the interbank market and there are two retail loan rate markup shocks
to household loans (µh,t) and entrepreneur loans (µe,t). On the demand side of credit, house-
hold loans and entrepreneur loans are subject to loan-to-value shocks νh,t and νe,t, respectively.
Households’ intertemporal consumption decisions are subject to an exogenous shock to house-
holds’ safe-asset holdings (ξb,t). Finally, an equity price shock (ξψ,t) contemporaneously affects
consumption, production and bank lending activities.
3.4 Estimation
The model is estimated with Bayesian techniques using U.S. data over the sample period 1982Q2−
2012Q3. The full sample covers the recession periods of 1990Q3−1991Q2, 2001Q1−2001Q4 and
2007Q4−2009Q2, and the Great Moderation period of 1982Q2−2006Q4.11 Since the model has
a total of 10 shocks, the data set contains 10 observable variables: output, inflation (GDP deflator),
equity price, household loans, entrepreneur loans, household assets, 3-month Treasury Bill rate,
Fed funds rate, mortgage rate, and Baa corporate bond rate. All variables except inflation and
interest rates are converted into real terms by dividing the GDP deflator. Prior to estimation, I take
the log-difference of real per capita variables.
A few points are worth noting in terms of the observable variables used for estimation. Firstly,
monetary authority funds plus household deposits (similar to the monetary base plus M2 money
supply) make up aggregate household safe assets. The motivation for this aggregation is two-fold.
This satisfies the arbitrage assumption in the model setup (Section 3.3.1.1) from unlimited access
to monetary authority funds. On the empirical side, it accommodates the recent surge in monetary
11NBER U.S. recession data is available at http://www.nber.org/cycles/cyclesmain.html. For the initial structural
break of the Great Moderation see, for example, Stock and Watson (2003, p.173) and Farmer (2012b, p.697). The
model is estimated using Dynare developed by Michel Juillard and his collaborators at CEPREMAP.
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authority funds between 2008−2011, resulting from the large-scale recapitalization of the banking
sector, which largely offset the significant shortage of household deposits during that time (see
also, Woodford, 2010). Therefore, it would be misleading to view household deposits as the sole
measure of bank liabilities (or available bank funding) when trying to observe the transmission
mechanism of financial intermediation. Secondly, as a consequence of this assumption, I use the
3-month Treasury Bill rate as the short-term safe-asset rate (i.e., the policy rate). Lastly, by the end
of 2009, outstanding financial commercial paper stood at $1.7 trillion. To capture this additional
financial stress on the effective interbank rate, which was not exhibited in the Great Moderation
period, I derive the interbank rate by averaging the effective Fed funds rate with the 3-month AA
financial commercial paper rate.
3.4.1 Calibrated parameters
Table 3.1 lists the parameters that are calibrated prior to estimation. In the first block, discount
factors {βh, βe, βB} fall in the interval [0.95, 0.99], where βh = 0.97 is the mean of saver and
borrower household discount factors 0.99 and 0.95 (see also, Iacoviello, 2005, p.751). I derive
the entrepreneur and bank discount factors (βe, βB) from the reciprocal of their relevant steady-
state markups over the steady-state quarterly safe asset rate (R = 1.01). For example, using
a steady-state quarterly gross real return to entrepreneur loans Re = 1.0383, and satisfying the
binding borrowing constraint condition (1/Re− βe) > 0, I set βe = 0.955. This ensures a similar
value for both the household and entrepreneur binding constraint conditions. The inverse of the
Frisch elasticity η is set to 1. The capital-output share α is set to 0.33, and the physical capital
depreciation rate δe is set to 0.025. A steady-state gross markup of X = 1.10 implies a price
elasticity of demand for differentiated retail goods (εp) of 11. The price elasticity of demand
for different types of labour εw is fixed at 5, implying a steady-state wage markup (µw) of 25%.
Lastly, based on well-established estimates (e.g., Smets and Wouters, 2003, 2007), I assume a
high degree of wage indexation (0.8) and let the probability of resetting an optimal wage (1− θw)
approximate an average length of wage contracts of one year.
The second block reports the steady-state aggregate ratios and the relevant U.S. banking sec-
tor conditions. The elasticities of substitution for household loans (εh) and entrepreneur loans (εe)
equal 1.441 and 1.353, respectively. The target capital requirement ratio τ equals 11%, reflect-
ing the recent U.S. banks’ balance sheet condition. The bank capital depreciation rate δB equals
0.1044.12 Parameter φψ captures the pass-through effect of equity price changes on bank capi-
tal accumulation. I set φψ to 0.25, based on preliminary estimations. Shares of household and
entrepreneur loans to total bank loans, the consumption-output ratio, and the total bank capital-
to-output ratio are calculated from the data means over the sample period. I restrict any other
12I assume that there are no undivided profits in the steady-state equilibrium, and therefore derive the value from
the net income data of all U.S. commercial banks (FDIC, 2012).
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Table 3.1: Calibrated parameters
Parameter Description Value
βh Household discount factor 0.97
βe Entrepreneur discount factor 0.955
βB Bank discount factor 0.986
η Inverse of the Frisch elasticity 1
α Capital share in the production function 0.33
δe Capital depreciation rate 0.025
εp Price elasticity of demand for goods 11
εw Price elasticity of demand for labour 5
θw Wage stickiness 0.75
γw Degree of wage indexation 0.8
τ Capital requirement ratio 0.11
εh Elasticity of substitution for household loans 1.441
εe Elasticity of substitution for entrepreneur loans 1.353
δB Sunk costs for bank capital management 0.1044
φψ Equity price pass-through on total bank capital 0.25
Lh/L Households’ share of total loans 0.46
Le/L Entrepreneurs’ share of total loans 0.54
C/Y Consumption-output ratio 0.679
KB/Y Total bank capital-output ratio 0.171
φw Weight on wages in borr. constraint 0.8
φk Weight on physical capital in borr. constraint 0.8
steady-state ratios in the banking sector to be consistent with the balance sheet definition and cap-
ital requirement. Finally, based on stable preliminary estimations, the weights on wages (φw) and
physical capital (φk) in the borrowing constraints are set to 0.8. This implies that, for example, a
negative 10% shock to equity prices will directly reduce household and entrepreneur creditworthi-
ness by 2%.
3.4.2 Prior distributions and posterior estimates
The prior distribution of the structural parameters are reported in columns 3−5 in Tables 3.2
and 3.3. I assume that the household’s coefficient of relative risk aversion (RRA) γ follows an
inverse-gamma distribution with a mean of 3 and a standard deviation of 0.5. Meanwhile, the
entrepreneur’s RRA is assumed to be much less than the household’s RRA (γe = 0.9), which
implies a preference for current period consumption gains. Both RRA values roughly correspond
with estimates of its reciprocal (the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption) in the
micro literature (e.g., Vissing-Jorgensen, 2002). The prior on habit formation parameter φ is set
at 0.65 with a standard deviation of 0.03 (e.g., Christiano et al., 2005). Parameters in the Phillips
curve are based on the estimates from Smets and Wouters (2003) and Christiano et al. (2010). The
parameters describing the monetary policy reaction function are chosen within the context of fi-
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Table 3.2: Structural parameters
Prior Distribution Posterior Distribution
Parameter Type Mean Std.dev Mean 2.5% Median 97.5%
Preferences
γ Household RRA Inv.Gamma 3 0.5 4.910 4.088 4.866 5.659
γe Entrepreneur RRA Inv.Gamma 0.9 0.1 1.087 0.888 1.073 1.279
φ Habit formation Beta 0.65 0.03 0.708 0.672 0.707 0.749
Prices
θR Price stickiness Beta 0.8 0.03 0.923 0.914 0.924 0.932
γp Degree of price indexation Beta 0.5 0.03 0.511 0.464 0.510 0.554
Monetary policy rule
κi Coefficient on lagged policy rate Beta 0.65 0.05 0.615 0.570 0.616 0.661
κπ Coefficient on inflation Gamma 1.5 0.05 1.612 1.529 1.612 1.697
κy Coefficient on output change Beta 0.25 0.02 0.261 0.228 0.260 0.292
Credit and banking
νh Households’ LTV ratio Beta 0.6 0.03 0.580 0.531 0.580 0.630
νe Entrepreneurs’ LTV ratio Beta 0.6 0.03 0.722 0.693 0.722 0.752
νB Interbank LTV ratio Beta 0.5 0.05 0.424 0.361 0.423 0.485
κh HH loan rate adjust. cost Gamma 5 2 15.22 11.87 15.07 18.51
κe Entrep. loan rate adjust. cost Gamma 5 2 6.890 5.720 6.890 8.072
κk Leverage deviation cost Gamma 5 2 1.255 1.038 1.254 1.443
Physical capital
κv Capital adjust. costs Gamma 2 0.5 2.292 1.847 2.263 2.689
Ke/Y Capital-output ratio Gamma 10.7 0.2 10.78 10.46 10.78 11.11
nancial frictions literature, based on the estimates of Christiano et al. (2010). I choose a reasonable
value of 0.6 as the prior mean for both the households’ LTV ratio (νh) and the entrepreneur’s LTV
ratio (νe). I set the prior mean of the interbank LTV ratio (νB) to 0.5 with a standard deviation of
0.05. The interest rate adjustment cost parameters {κk, κh, κe} are assumed to follow a gamma
distribution with a mean of 5 and a standard deviation of 2 (see also, Gerali et al., 2010). Analo-
gous to the entrepreneur investment schedule in Iacoviello (2005, p.752), I set the prior mean of
the physical capital adjustment cost parameter κv to 2. The prior mean of the capital-output ratio is
set to 10.7 based on its steady-state value. Lastly, the prior distributions for the AR(1) coefficients
and the standard deviations of the shocks are reported in columns 3−5 in Table 3.3.
The estimated posterior statistics for the structural parameters are reported in columns 6−9 in
Tables 3.2 and 3.3. Parameters for preferences, prices, and the monetary policy rule all conform
well within the literature consensus. Shocks for monetary policy, loan rate markups to households
and entrepreneurs, and the price markup are not persistent, while the rest are strongly persistent.
The LTV ratio for households (0.58) is lower than that of entrepreneurs (0.72), which suggests that
entrepreneurs can more easily collateralize their loans (see also, Iacoviello, 2005, p. 752). In fact,
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Table 3.3: Exogenous processes
Prior Distribution Posterior Distribution
Parameter Type Mean Std.dev Mean 2.5% Median 97.5%
AR coefficients
ρz Technology beta 0.98 0.005 0.981 0.979 0.981 0.984
ρi Monetary policy beta 0.2 0.05 0.431 0.347 0.433 0.513
ρb Household asset beta 0.97 0.005 0.970 0.967 0.971 0.973
ρe Entrep. loan markup beta 0.3 0.05 0.422 0.352 0.423 0.493
ρh Household loan markup beta 0.2 0.05 0.269 0.180 0.268 0.347
ρνh Households’ LTV beta 0.95 0.005 0.951 0.943 0.951 0.960
ρνe Entrepreneurs’ LTV beta 0.55 0.05 0.618 0.561 0.620 0.680
ρψ Equity beta 0.8 0.05 0.871 0.835 0.872 0.906
ρp Price markup beta 0.3 0.05 0.373 0.292 0.373 0.461
ρt Capital requirement beta 0.85 0.05 0.782 0.722 0.782 0.843
Standard deviations
εz Technology Inv.Gamma 0.02 inf 0.016 0.014 0.016 0.017
εi Monetary policy Inv.Gamma 0.01 inf 0.008 0.007 0.008 0.009
εb Household asset Inv.Gamma 0.01 inf 0.008 0.007 0.008 0.009
εe Entrep. loan markup Inv.Gamma 0.08 inf 0.114 0.086 0.114 0.144
εh Household loan markup Inv.Gamma 0.08 inf 0.210 0.153 0.206 0.273
ενh Households’ LTV Inv.Gamma 0.03 inf 0.021 0.019 0.021 0.024
ενe Entrepreneurs’ LTV Inv.Gamma 0.03 inf 0.029 0.023 0.028 0.034
εψ Equity Inv.Gamma 0.01 inf 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.006
εp Price markup Inv.Gamma 0.002 inf 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
εt Capital requirement Inv.Gamma 0.015 inf 0.012 0.010 0.012 0.014
high estimates for νh and νe imply that changes to household creditworthiness and entrepreneur
net worth have strong and persistent effects on aggregate demand and output. An estimated in-
terbank LTV of 0.42 highlights the importance of bank market power by giving a large weight to
retail loan rate markups (see Eq. 3.7). Corresponding to the observed persistence of retail credit
spread movements, large posterior means for the entrepreneur and household loan rate adjustment
cost parameters (κe = 6.89 and κh = 15.22) imply a large degree of retail loan rate stickiness.
Furthermore, κe < κh confirms the recent relatively sharper changes to the entrepreneur credit
spread in the data (see also, Gerali et al., 2010, p.124). A value of 1.255 for the leverage devi-
ation cost, on the other hand, is significantly smaller. However, this value is based on the close
relationship between the short-term policy rate and the short-term interbank rate. As shown in the
results in Section 3.5, and contrary to Gerali et al. (2010) for the Euro area, I find a clear role for
the sticky-rate structure in commercial banking for both business cycle dynamics and credit spread
variability.
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3.5 Results
In this section, I use the DSGE model developed in Section 3.3 (hereafter, the baseline model) to
determine the main financial factors that impact credit spread variability over the Great Moderation
and Great Recession periods. Firstly, I establish the prevailing financial factors in credit spread
variability over the full sample period (1982Q2−2012Q3). Using the historical shock decom-
position of each credit spread I show how structural shocks predict the cyclical pattern of credit
spreads in the U.S. business cycle. Secondly, I compare U.S. recession episodes over the Great
Moderation and Great Recession periods. To do this, I re-estimate the baseline model with three
sub-sample periods covering the 1990−91, 2001 and 2007−09 recessions. I determine whether
factors that impact credit spreads have changed over time; and whether there are any clear differ-
ences in the transmission mechanisms of credit spread variability during the Great Moderation and
Great Recession periods. I conclude this section with a robustness analysis of the baseline model.
3.5.1 Impact factors on credit spread variability
Figure 3.3 provides the historical shock decomposition of the interbank and retail credit spreads.
Here, I focus on how the structural shocks predict cyclical patterns of credit spreads over the
Great Moderation and Great Recession periods. Both supply- and demand-side factors explain the
historical interbank credit spread well. On the demand side, LTV shocks contribute significantly
to interbank credit spread variability. For instance, a negative entrepreneur LTV shock reduces
bank assets, and raises the capital-asset ratio—narrowing the interbank credit spread. This clearly
corresponds with the post-recession credit slumps of 1992−1995, 2002−2004 and 2009−2012,
observed in the data. Conversely, we see a similar effect for the large credit boom period be-
tween 1997 and 2001. On the supply-side, we observe a significant impact of the bank capital
requirement shock on interbank credit spread variability in 2007−09 recession. Furthermore, the
collapse of the equity market during the 2001 and 2007−09 recession periods created some ad-
ditional financial stress. The monetary policy shock did not contribute significantly to interbank
credit spread variability over the Great Moderation and Great Recession periods. Whereas, the
technology shock only contributed significantly to the 2007-09 recession and subsequent credit
slump.
The persistence of retail credit spread widening or narrowing is driven by bank market power
over retail loan rate markups. There is, however, one exception. Leading up to the August 2007
crisis, monetary policy has an extremely persistent effect on narrowing retail credit spreads—more
than offsetting the loan rate markups. This observation gives credence to the evidence that mone-
tary authorities kept the policy rate too low from 2002Q3 to 2006Q3 (Taylor, 2007, p.2-3), inadver-
tently creating the incentive for banks to seek larger profit margins by increasing risky portfolios
(Adrian and Shin, 2011; Borio and Zhu, 2012). The widening of retail credit spreads occurs at the
peak of each recession period (1990Q3−1991Q2, 2001Q1−2001Q4 and 2007Q4−2009Q2). This
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Figure 3.3: Historical decomposition of credit spreads (full-sample)
reflects the observation from the interest rate data that credit spreads become increasingly narrow
towards the end of boom phases of the business cycle, and conversely widen in recession periods
(see, Gilchrist and Zakrajšek, 2012, p.1696).
In terms of the relationship between equity prices and credit spread variability, the impact of
the equity price shock on credit spread variability is small. Yet, we observe the recurring pattern
of falling equity prices and widening credit spreads during U.S. recessions, the 2007Q4−2009Q2
recession in particular. Although a technology shock produces the negative correlation between
equity prices and net credit spreads (see Figure 3.6), it is unlikely that a single large fundamental
shock is able to generate systemic financial stress in both equity and credit markets. Rather, it is
more likely due to a combination of financial shocks and real shocks.13
In summary, we observe bank market power as the primary source of credit spread variability.
This is along the lines of Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012), in which the authors find that it is the
supply-side factors of financial intermediation that dominate the demand-side factors in driving
credit spread variability. By borrowing on short-term rates and lending on long-term rates banks
carry balance sheet risk, but also large profit-making margins. Financial intermediaries exert their
13From the DSGE model, the posterior theoretical moments show that output has a strong positive correlation with
equity and a strong negative correlation with net credit spreads (see Table C.1 in the Appendix).
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market power over net interest margins between their assets and liabilities, to the extent that they
impose a measure of risk or desired profitability on interest rates charged. On the demand side, the
financial accelerator channel plays a significant role in driving interbank credit spread variability
only. Finally, the equity price channel exacerbates movements in credit spreads, but cannot be
regarded as a main driving force of credit spread variability.
3.5.2 Great Moderation verse Great Recession
In this section, I investigate: first, whether factors that impact the variability of credit spreads dif-
fers in the three recession periods; and second, whether there are any clear shifts in the driving
forces behind credit spread variability across the three recession periods. To do so, I re-estimate
the baseline model with three sub-sample periods. Each sub-sample period includes a maxi-
mum of twenty quarters before and after each recession’s peak and trough: 1985Q3−1996Q2;
1996Q1−2006Q4; and 2002Q4−2012Q3.
Although the recessions of 1990−91 and 2001 were milder than the 2007−09 one, a compar-
ative study by Peter Ireland (2011) shows that the pattern of shocks has not changed significantly
throughout the Great Moderation and Great Recession periods. In fact, Ireland (2011) finds that all
three recessions were caused by a similar combination of exogenous demand and supply shocks,
where the notable difference for the Great Recession is that these adverse shocks were deeper,
and lasted longer. The author argues that while expansionary monetary policy helped in cushion-
ing the 1990−91 and 2001 recessions, the zero lower bound on the policy rate created a de facto
contractionary policy in 2009. This constraint contributed to both the duration and deepness of
the recession. Similarly, Stock and Watson (2003), Sims and Zha (2006) and Smets and Wouters
(2007) find that the start of the Great Moderation cannot be attributed to changes in structural
parameters—that is, the endogenous transmission mechanism of shocks—but rather a reduction
in the volatility of a similar combination of exogenous shocks.
Table 3.4 reports the contribution of the structural shocks to the variance of credit spreads at
1-quarter, 1-year, and 5-year horizons. Here, supply-side financial factors account for a great part
of credit spread variability in the 2007−09 recession period. In addition, the impact of technology
shocks and monetary policy shocks has fallen considerably during all three recession periods. The
parameter estimates for each of the U.S. recession sub-samples (see Table C.2 in the Appendix)
reveal little evidence of significant changes in the structural parameters. In contrast, the posterior
means for the standard deviations of household’s and entrepreneur’s LTV shocks (ενh and ενe)
have declined since the 1990−91 recession, while the standard deviation for the entrepreneur loan
markup shock (εe) has steadily increased. This indicates a shift from demand-side to supply-side
credit market shocks.
Capital requirement shocks have the largest influence (approximately 30% over the forecast
horizon) on interbank credit spread variability for both the 2007−09 and 1990−91 recession peri-
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Table 3.4: Variance decomposition of credit spreads for the U.S. recession periods
Interbank spread
2007−09: Horizons 2001: Horizons 1990−91: Horizons
Shocks 1-quart. 1-year 5-years 1-quart. 1-year 5-years 1-quart. 1-year 5-years
εz 0.086 0.063 0.613 0.110 0.109 0.521 0.120 0.107 0.384
εi 0.039 0.046 0.015 0.055 0.072 0.032 0.065 0.091 0.057
εp 0.007 0.007 0.055 0.003 0.004 0.028 0.001 0.002 0.023
εb 0.001 0.003 0.023 0.001 0.002 0.034 0.000 0.001 0.027
ενh 0.288 0.233 0.070 0.244 0.236 0.088 0.317 0.292 0.183
ενe 0.086 0.070 0.061 0.208 0.181 0.145 0.054 0.055 0.069
εh 0.003 0.013 0.006 0.001 0.012 0.010 0.001 0.007 0.008
εe 0.073 0.068 0.022 0.097 0.094 0.032 0.020 0.019 0.013
εt 0.320 0.403 0.107 0.209 0.235 0.088 0.325 0.353 0.178
εψ 0.099 0.093 0.030 0.073 0.055 0.020 0.097 0.072 0.057
Household credit spread
2007−09: Horizons 2001: Horizons 1990−91: Horizons
Shocks 1-quart. 1-year 5-years 1-quart. 1-year 5-years 1-quart. 1-year 5-years
εz 0.024 0.011 0.041 0.038 0.021 0.095 0.087 0.096 0.374
εi 0.245 0.154 0.148 0.311 0.195 0.179 0.412 0.284 0.255
εp 0.002 0.004 0.026 0.001 0.003 0.010 0.001 0.001 0.006
εb 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.002
ενh 0.080 0.038 0.025 0.050 0.025 0.018 0.088 0.049 0.027
ενe 0.048 0.021 0.015 0.091 0.039 0.028 0.024 0.013 0.017
εh 0.495 0.721 0.697 0.420 0.674 0.632 0.270 0.488 0.262
εe 0.035 0.016 0.011 0.038 0.018 0.013 0.011 0.008 0.007
εt 0.055 0.026 0.031 0.034 0.017 0.017 0.073 0.041 0.031
εψ 0.015 0.007 0.005 0.016 0.008 0.007 0.034 0.020 0.018
Entrepreneur credit spread
2007−09: Horizons 2001: Horizons 1990−91: Horizons
Shocks 1-quart. 1-year 5-years 1-quart. 1-year 5-years 1-quart. 1-year 5-years
εz 0.023 0.018 0.096 0.033 0.023 0.128 0.100 0.134 0.444
εi 0.152 0.088 0.120 0.232 0.147 0.155 0.423 0.305 0.254
εp 0.001 0.002 0.027 0.001 0.002 0.009 0.001 0.001 0.006
εb 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.003
ενh 0.053 0.024 0.018 0.038 0.019 0.016 0.091 0.054 0.028
ενe 0.031 0.013 0.012 0.069 0.031 0.026 0.024 0.016 0.020
εh 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
εe 0.693 0.833 0.692 0.588 0.758 0.641 0.248 0.421 0.197
εt 0.035 0.016 0.028 0.026 0.013 0.015 0.076 0.045 0.031
εψ 0.011 0.005 0.004 0.013 0.007 0.006 0.037 0.023 0.018
Note: see Table 3.3 for shock parameter descriptions.
ods. Compared to the 1990−91 recession period, however, the results show that over 20-quarters
the entrepreneur loan markup shock accounts for 5% more of the 2007−09 interbank spread vari-
ance. On the demand-side, the influence of the household’s LTV shock (ενh) is strong over 1-
quarter and 1-year horizons for each U.S. recession period. The entrepreneur’s LTV shock (ενe)
only plays a significant role in explaining interbank credit spread variability during the 2001 re-
cession. As such, the interbank credit spread in the 2001 recession period seems to be less rooted
in supply-side factors. Comparing all three recession periods, I find that the impact of technol-
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Figure 3.4: Historical decomposition for entrepreneur credit spread: 2007−09 recession (top-left); 2001
recession (bottom-left); 1990−91 recession (bottom-right)
ogy shocks has fallen steadily over shorter horizons, while the impact of monetary policy has
fallen significantly over all horizons. As a result, interbank credit spread variability in the recent
recession is more strongly rooted in supply-side financial factors.
Bank market power plays a dominant role in explaining the variability of both retail credit
spreads. Across the three recession periods, there is an increasing trend in the contribution of loan
markup shocks (εe and εh) to the variability of both retail credit spreads at all horizons. In contrast,
the contribution of LTV shocks (ενh and ενe) are small and ambiguous across the three recession
periods. Analogous to the interbank credit spread, there is a remarkable decline in the influence of
technology and monetary policy shocks over the three recession periods. These findings suggest a
shift towards a greater influence of supply-side financial factors in the 2007−09 recession.
Two important observations are worth noting in the historical shock decomposition of the en-
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trepreneur credit spread in Figure 3.4.14 Firstly, from the demand-side of the credit market, the
influence of LTV shocks has declined since the 1990−91 recession, while the bank capital require-
ment shock exacerbates and prolongs credit spread variability over the 2007−09 recession period.
Secondly, for each recession period, policy rate adjustments consistently lead movements in the
spread, which are prolonged by entrepreneur loan markups (bank market power). For the 1990−91
and 2001 recessions, the entrepreneur credit spread returns to its steady state after approximately
three years, whereas it takes much longer to converge to steady state during the 2007−09 reces-
sion. After the 1990−91 and 2001 recessions the policy rate continues to fall for a number of
quarters, which sharply reduces the spread. However, from 2010 onwards, we see that the zero
lower bound prevents the policy rate from counteracting the persistence of retail loan markups and
higher capital requirements. As a result, the direct influence of the policy rate on nonfinancial
long-term rates is completely ineffective over the 2007−09 recession period.15
3.5.3 Robustness analysis
For the robustness analysis, I compare the baseline model with three variant versions of the model
developed in the paper. I first compare the impulse responses to monetary and technology shocks,
and then the parameter estimates across models. The robustness analysis also provides more valu-
able insights for analysis on credit spread variability.
The three variant models serve to highlight three key issues. For the first variant model (FI
hereafter) I assume flexible rate adjustments on retail loan rate setting. That is, there are no
quadratic retail loan rate adjustment costs (κh = κe = 0). The comparison analysis between
the baseline model and the flexible interest rate model highlights the role of bank market power
through sticky retail rate adjustment. For the second variant version (TB hereafter) I use the 10-
year Treasury Bill as the observed data for the interbank rate. Introducing the interbank spread
between the 3-month and 10-year Treasury Bill rates highlights the influence of monetary policy
over long-term interest rates. By doing so, I am able to test the robustness of the credit spread
transmission mechanisms, as defined in Section 3.2. For the third variant version (NI hereafter),
I re-estimate the model without the observed variable for the interbank rate. In addition, I drop
the capital requirement shock to match nine shocks with the remaining nine observed variables.
As this NI model is in line with the estimated models with multiple interest rates in the literature
(e.g., Gerali et al., 2010), it serves a useful reference for the baseline model.
14For the sake of space, I only report the results for the entrepreneur credit spread here. Results for the household
credit spread follow a similar pattern, and are available upon request.
15With the use of impulse response functions, Appendix C.3 provides a supplementary discussion on the role of
monetary policy shocks and financial shocks across the U.S. recession periods.
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Figure 3.5: Impulse response to a contractionary monetary policy shock
3.5.3.1 Nominal and real shocks
Figure 3.5 shows the impulse responses of the observed variables to a contractionary monetary
policy shock.16 Comparing the baseline model to the FI model, reveals an important role for sticky
rate adjustments: during a recession (or boom), imperfect bank competition will stifle efforts
of monetary authorities to stimulate (or attenuate) aggregate demand through the conventional
interest-rate policy. Without sticky rate adjustments, the decline in total loans and output is much
more severe in response to a contractionary monetary policy. The dynamics of the TB model and
the NI model follow a similar pattern as that of the baseline model. There are some uninformative
differences in credit spreads and equity prices though; as the difference in the impact of monetary
policy on output, inflation and balance sheet quantities is negligible among the three models. More
importantly, the influence of monetary policy on the interbank spread in the TB model (i.e., the 10-
yr Treasury Bill) provides no distinct advantage in the results. Similarly, compared to the baseline
model and the NI model, the pass-through onto retail credit spreads is only slightly improved. In
other words, the influence of the conventional monetary policy on long-term interest rates is not
16For simplicity, I aggregate household loans and entrepreneur loans, and label it total loans. I also include the
response of the capital-asset ratio. The dynamics of the baseline model in response to a contractionary monetary policy
shock are discussed in Appendix C.3. Here I focus on robustness analysis.
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Figure 3.6: Impulse response to a positive technology shock
robust.
Figure 3.6 shows the impulse responses of the observed variables to a positive technology
shock. For the baseline model, the effect of the technology shock on output is strong and persistent.
The positive financial wealth effect on household consumption subsequently fuels the equity price
boom (see also, Castelnuovo and Nisticò, 2010, p.1720). The bullish equity market improves both
the demand and supply of the credit market. On the demand side, borrower’s creditworthiness
increases the feasible amount of loans. The improved credit demand and widen bank profit margins
propagate the dynamics of the model through both financial accelerator and bank capital channels
(see, Christiano et al., 2010, p.55-58). On the supply side, increased market value of bank equity
increases bank funding and, therefore, shifts the credit supply schedule upward. Conversely, the
policy rate increases in response to higher output and inflation. Higher interest rates dampen credit
demand, and raise households’ demand for safe assets in the medium- to long-term. There is little
variation in the dynamics among variant models in response to the technology shock, except for
retail credit spreads. For the FI model, responses of retail credit spreads are exacerbated. This
reiterates the importance of sticky retail rate adjustment in the banking sector.
In summary, based on the model comparison, the baseline model is found to be robust to
alternative versions of the model. Moreover, compared the the TB model, the baseline model
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Table 3.5: Alternative model parameter estimates
Posterior distribution means Posterior distribution means
No 10-yr No 10-yr
Baseline Flexible interbank Treasury Baseline Flexible interbank Treasury
(FI) rate (NI) Bill (TB) (FI) rate (NI) Bill (TB)
Marginal
density 4357 4155 3765 4332
Parameters Parameters
γ 4.910 4.578 4.806 4.543 ρz 0.981 0.987 0.981 0.981
γe 1.087 0.878 1.117 0.872 ρi 0.431 0.337 0.433 0.409
φ 0.708 0.713 0.705 0.708 ρb 0.970 0.973 0.970 0.970
θR 0.923 0.924 0.907 0.908 ρe 0.422 0.868 0.449 0.549
γp 0.511 0.500 0.520 0.523 ρh 0.269 0.919 0.276 0.583
κi 0.615 0.765 0.642 0.669 ρνh 0.951 0.952 0.951 0.952
κπ 1.612 1.580 1.598 1.591 ρνe 0.618 0.617 0.609 0.591
κy 0.261 0.272 0.264 0.262 ρψ 0.871 0.896 0.881 0.877
νh 0.580 0.581 0.584 0.487 ρp 0.373 0.377 0.440 0.411
νe 0.722 0.701 0.690 0.682 ρt 0.782 0.861 - 0.847
νB 0.424 0.158 0.321 0.063 εz 0.016 0.016 0.015 0.015
κk 1.255 2.176 2.629 3.005 εi 0.008 0.006 0.008 0.007
κe 6.890 - 8.024 6.208 εb 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008
κh 15.22 - 16.32 12.96 εe 0.114 0.016 0.105 0.027
κv 2.292 1.530 2.199 2.519 εh 0.210 0.014 0.197 0.026
Ke/Y 10.78 10.89 10.77 10.79 ενh 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021
ενe 0.029 0.013 0.027 0.019
εψ 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.005
εp 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
εt 0.012 0.009 - 0.015
Note: I exclude parameter descriptions, prior means and standard deviations (see Tables 3.2 and 3.3),
and statistic confidence intervals in the table due to the limited space.
conforms more closely to the implied results of the NI model. The dynamics of the baseline
model in response to both monetary and technology shocks conform with the established literature
evidence. Indeed, as shown in Section 3.5.3.2 below, the comparison of the estimated parameters
between variant models reinforces these findings.
3.5.3.2 Alternative model parameter estimates
Table 3.5 compares the posterior estimates of the structural parameters for each alternative model.
Overall, the parameter estimates are mostly consistent across models, indicating the results are
robust. The most notable variations occur in some of the parameters in the banking sector, which
reiterates the importance of the supply-side factors in determining credit spread variability. Com-
pared to the baseline model, the FI model predictably gives more weight to stochastic markup
shocks in retail loan rate setting since sticky retail loan rate adjustment falls away. This is indi-
cated by a decline of the estimated interbank LTV ratio (νB) from 0.424 to 0.158. As discussed in
Section 3.3.1.2, 1− νB captures the weight of the stochastic markup in retail loan rate setting. At
the same time, zero sticky retail rate adjustment is now compensated for by a significant jump in
the persistence of stochastic markup shocks (ρe, ρh). Compared to all three alternative versions of
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the model, a larger leverage deviation cost parameter (κk) in the baseline model creates additional
imperfect rate adjustment by magnifying the influence of the capital-asset ratio on the interbank
rate and, hence, long-term retail loan rates. This suggests that the baseline model represents the
influence of leverage deviation costs more accurately.
The shocks and frictions considered in each estimated model determine its ability to fit the
data. The relative importance of the baseline model can therefore be measured by comparing its
marginal data density (measured in log points) to that of each alternative model.17 For flexible
rate adjustment, the marginal density of the FI model falls from 4357 to 4155. This highlights the
importance of sticky retail rate adjustment for capturing credit spread data. For the TB model, the
marginal density falls from 4357 to 4332. This suggests that the model setup is less suited to ex-
plain variability between the 3-month and 10-year Treasury Bill rates and, hence, misspecification
due to the capital requirement shock is less likely in the baseline model. Therefore, the structural
relationship in the baseline model (between bank balance sheet adjustments and the short-term
interbank rate) is empirically preferable to that of the TB model.
3.6 Concluding remarks
This paper develops a New-Keynesian DSGE model with a central role for financial intermediation
and equity assets to assess the influence of financial factors on credit spread variability. Large
movements in credit spreads are closely linked to U.S. recessions over the Great Moderation and
Great Recession periods and, hence, seen as an indicator of financial market stress. Overall, we
observe supply-side factors as the primary source of credit spread variability, which is along the
lines of Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012). That is, retail loan markups account for more than half of
the variability of retail credit spreads. Moreover, sticky rate adjustments significantly alter the path
of retail loan rates relative to the policy rate. Monetary policy has a strong influence on the short-
term interbank rate, whereas the effectiveness of interest-rate policy on long-term nonfinancial
loan rates is much weaker. Imperfect bank competition attenuates the effect of monetary policy
through both sticky rate adjustments and a counter-cyclical bank capital-asset ratio. Equity prices
exacerbate movements in credit spreads through the financial accelerator channel, but cannot be
regarded as a main driving force of credit spread variability. Both financial accelerator and bank
capital channels play a significant role in propagating the movements of credit spreads.
Ireland (2011) finds that all three recessions were caused by a similar combination of exoge-
nous demand and supply shocks, where the notable difference for the Great Recession is that these
adverse shocks were deeper, and lasted longer. In contrast, we observe a remarkable decline in
the influence of technology and monetary policy shocks over three recession periods. From the
demand-side of the credit market, the influence of LTV shocks has declined since the 1990−91
17The exception being the NI model: given the same prior distributions, one less observable variable means that the
marginal data density will always be lower than the baseline model.
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recession, while the bank capital requirement shock exacerbates and prolongs credit spread vari-
ability over the 2007−09 recession period. Moreover, across the three recession periods, there is
an increasing trend in the contribution of loan markup shocks to the variability of both retail credit
spreads.
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Chapter 4
The effectiveness of countercyclical
capital requirements and contingent
convertible capital: a dual approach to
macroeconomic stability
4.1 Introduction
The purpose of macroprudential policy is to limit systemic financial distress, with the ultimate
objective of curtailing macroeconomic costs associated with that financial instability. One such
instrument relied on by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is that of countercyclical
capital requirements (as in Basel III). Indeed, both financial institutions and regulatory authorities
are increasingly looking into a dual role for contingent convertible capital instruments (CoCos) and
countercyclical capital adequacy (CA) ratios (Avdjiev et al., 2013; Calomiris and Herring, 2013;
Galati and Moessner, 2013).1 Although CoCos are primarily designed to re-capitalize individual
bank balance sheets, its adoption within the macroprudential toolkit provides a role for CoCos—
alongside Tier 1 equity capital—in mitigating systemic financial distress.
This paper studies the effectiveness of CA ratios and CoCos in limiting financial instability,
and its associated influence on the real economy. Moreover, this paper assesses whether CoCos
complement the objectives of a Basel III macroprudential policy. To do this, I augment both fea-
tures into a standard real business cycle (RBC) framework with an equity market and a banking
sector. Regulatory capital requirements enter through a quadratic adjustment cost on bank lever-
age, which includes a time-variant capital adequacy rule. The corporate finance model of Jaffee
et al. (2013) provides the core framework to introduce CoCos into the general equilibrium model.
The model is calibrated to real U.S. data and used for simulations. To assess the effectiveness of
1Both the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and the Federal Reserve are in the process of formalizing the
standards for contingent capital within Basel III regulatory requirements.
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countercyclical capital requirements, a comparison analysis of alternative Basel regimes is done.
Here, adopting an RBC framework provides a useful benchmark to observe the dynamic interac-
tions between the financial system and the real economy.
While a capital adequacy rule provides a coherent framework for macroprudential policy, it
neglects the barriers to external equity financing. Borio and Zhu (2012, p.238) identify a number
of reasons for why banks are reluctant to issue new equity or reduce dividends. For example, the
tax shield on debt financing discourages equity financing; and equity issuances may signal weak
performance (i.e., adverse selection). The authors also identify distortions related to asymmetric
information, agency problems and deposit insurance. Moreover, the return on equity for banks—
the maximizing objective for its shareholders—is lowered when new equity is issued or dividends
are cut. Conversely, in times of financial distress, the willingness of private investors to supply ex-
ternal equity capital can quickly dissipate. As a result, when the banking sector is over-leveraged,
a weak macroeconomic outlook will exacerbate financial instability.
That said, contingent convertible debt provides an answer to equity issuances during bank-
ing crises and recessions (Avdjiev et al., 2013). CoCos are debt instruments which automatically
convert into common equity when, for example, the bank’s capital-asset ratio falls below a pre-
determined level. At this point of financial distress, equity shares are issued to CoCo holders at
their current market price, commensurate to the face value of the original debt instrument. The
main objective of CoCos is to therefore replace the lost capital of a financial institution in a timely
manner (Calomiris and Herring, 2013). This addresses, in particular, two important financial dis-
tress phenomena: one, the amplification of asset fire sales can be curtailed or attenuated; two,
the capital-asset ratios of financial institutions are stabilized in a timely manner at the prescribed
market value of equity. For example, in the case of systemically important financial institutions
(SIFIs), a negative shock to capital-asset ratios (induced by a freeze in the interbank market) re-
sults in a fire sale of assets as these SIFIs attempt to stabilize their capital positions. However, the
role of CoCos would be to automatically convert into common equity at a prescribed trigger value.
As a result, the soundness of bank balance sheets are more readily restored.
The main findings of the paper are as follows. First, a Basel III macroprudential policy im-
proves the balance sheet position of banks and attenuates the effects of shocks on the real economy.
That is, relative to simulations of the Basel I and Basel II regimes (akin to fixed and procyclical
capital requirements, respectively), a countercyclical CA rule reduces business cycle fluctuations.
Second, CoCos effectively re-capitalize the banking sector and foster the objectives of counter-
cyclical capital requirements. Under financial shocks, CoCos provide an effective automatic sta-
bilization effect on the financial cycle and the real economy. Whereas, technology shocks produce
little variability in bank capital-asset ratios. As a result, a countercyclical CA rule dominates Co-
Cos in the stabilization of real shocks. These findings suggests that CA ratios and CoCos provide
an effective dual approach to macroprudential policy. On the one hand, a capital adequacy rule
mitigates the build-up of systemic risk through a capital buffer. On the other hand, CoCos are able
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to reduce the impact of a sudden decline in bank capital. Another result of the paper highlights the
robust cyclical properties of the model with respect to the data. Here, financial shocks play a key
role in matching financial data variability and reducing the correlation of variables with output.
This paper is related to an expanding literature on the impact of various macroprudential policy
tools on the broader economy. Currently, most dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
models study either the interaction between monetary policy and macroprudential policy (e.g.,
Angelini et al., 2012; Angeloni and Faia, 2013; Quint and Rabanal, 2014) or the performance of
loan-to-value rules and capital adequacy rules—i.e., the balance sheet channel and the bank lend-
ing channel, respectively (e.g., Funke and Paetz, 2012; Brzoza-Brzezina et al., 2013; Lambertini
et al., 2013).2 Although the balance sheet channel forms an important part of the transmission
mechanism of financial instability, this paper highlights the bank lending channel in the propa-
gation of shocks to the real economy (e.g., Markovic, 2006; Meh and Moran, 2010). In other
words, to satisfy regulatory requirements banks can either raise new capital or reduce their supply
of loans. This paper also focuses on the dynamic interactions between the financial system and the
real economy, to which two papers are closely related. Firstly, the model setup in Van den Heuvel
(2008) is closely related to the one developed here. That is, both models derive a role for debt and
equity financing, where firms and banks maximize the return on shareholders’ equity. However, in
Van den Heuvel (2008), banks and firms only last for one period, and a minimum capital require-
ment arises to mitigate the moral hazard problem from deposit insurance. Secondly, de Walque
et al. (2010) augment an RBC model with a banking sector and similarly study the effects of cap-
ital requirements on the business cycle. But instead of incorporating an interbank market with
liquidity injections, the model developed here introduces a role for contingent convertible capital.
Lastly, although macroprudential policies are designed to mitigate financial instability, the lack
of consensus on a clear definition for financial stability is well-documented (Galati and Moessner,
2013, p.848). Following Borio (2011, p.17), I measure the success of macroprudential policy by
its ability to “mitigate the financial cycle"—that is, to reduce the procyclicality of the financial
system. On the one hand, the equity premium, the bank capital-asset ratio and the credit spread
serve as a measure of financial stability. On the other hand, output, consumption and investment
serve as a measure of macroeconomic stability. The “risk" of financial instability is related to
the deviation of bank leverage from a target leverage ratio (e.g., Christensen et al., 2011), while
the countercyclical CA rule adjusts to output growth (e.g., Angelini et al., 2012; Brzoza-Brzezina
et al., 2013).3
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes the model and
2Galati and Moessner (2013) provide an extensive literature review on macroprudential policy. Borio and Zhu
(2012) also provide an overview of the theoretical studies on the role of bank capital in monetary transmission, and
specifically highlight the importance of the “risk-taking channel" of monetary policy.
3A number of studies promote the credit-to-GDP ratio as a more robust early warning indicator (e.g., Drehmann
and Tsatsaronis, 2014). Within the DSGE framework, however, deviations of output from steady-state simplifies the
solution of the model, without loss of generality.
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introduces a role for contingent convertible capital. Section 4.3 discusses the calibration of the
model and its implied steady-state values. Section 4.4 compares the model’s numerical simulations
with U.S. data and presents the main findings. Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 The model economy
This model departs from the standard one-sector, representative agent RBC model in two ways.
First, introducing a banking sector creates a market for financial intermediation. More precisely,
banks convert household deposits into loanable funds, from which nonfinancial firms borrow to
finance their capital input. Second, both nonfinancial firms and banks can raise external equity
financing by issuing shares to households. For simplicity, firms and banks are assumed to be
wholly-owned by households, and therefore maximize the return on shareholders’ equity. Mean-
while, only banks hold contingent convertible debt as a means to satisfy their capital adequacy
ratios.
To ensure that the Modigliani and Miller (1958) theorem no longer holds, frictions arise be-
tween the rates of return on deposits, loans and equity. In the real sector, firms face a borrowing
constraint and households have a liquidity preference for holding deposits.4 As a result, the credit
spread and the equity premium are linked to the marginal value of installed capital and the marginal
utility of liquidity services. In the financial sector, banks face quadratic costs for deviating from
a target leverage ratio, such that higher levels of leverage increase the return on equity relative to
debt. Here, the target leverage ratio follows a capital adequacy rule, which is either independent
from the business cycle (Basel I), or endogenous (Basel II and Basel III). In addition, introducing
a capital requirement and a borrowing constraint implies that some proportion of external funding,
for both banks and firms, will always comprise of equity.
4.2.1 Households













where βt is the discount factor. Utility depends positively on the consumption of goods Ct rel-
ative to habit formation, and negatively on the supply of labour hours Ht. φ measures the habit
persistence based on aggregate past consumption. Households’ financial wealth is made up of
risk-free deposits Dt and equity investments Et. Similar to Van den Heuvel (2008) and Chris-
tiano et al. (2010) I assume households derive direct utility from the liquidity services of deposits.
4Given that households are risk averse and utility maximizing, the latter case is motivated by the greater risk and
larger transaction costs associated with stocks compared to deposits. (see, e.g., Van den Heuvel, 2008; Brunnermeier
et al., 2012)
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This drives a positive wedge in the spread between the return on equity and the return on bank
deposits. η measures the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labour supply. γ captures the inverse of
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption.
Eq. 4.2 gives the household budget constraint:
Ct + Dt + QtEt = WtHt + Rt−1Dt−1 + (Qt + Vt)Et−1. (4.2)
The household allocates periodic income from wages (Wt), gross real returns on deposits
(Rt−1Dt−1), real capital gains/losses (QtEt−1) and real dividend income (VtEt−1) to current
consumption and new financial wealth holdings. In aggregate, the total equity stock Et equals the
total supply of equity from banks Ebt and firms E
f
t .
5 Qt is the equity price in current period t.

















where Ret+1 = (Qt+1 +Vt+1)/Qt is the gross real return on equity and Uc,t = (Ct−φCt−1)−γ is
the marginal utility of consumption. Eq. 4.3 is the household’s demand for deposits. Eq. 4.4 gives
the standard real wage equation: that is, the real wage equals the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption and labour. Eq. 4.5 gives the consumption Euler equation, based on the
standard asset-pricing equation for equity.
Combining Eq. 4.5 and Eq. 4.3 illustrates the spread between Ret+1 and Rt, based on household








Here Eq. 4.6 states that the marginal utility of the liquidity services (Ud,t = D−1t ), expressed in
units of consumption, equals the equity premium.
4.2.2 Nonfinancial firms
Nonfinancial firms manage the goods producing sector, and are owned by households. A firm’s
objective is to therefore maximize the value of its shareholders equity.6 Analogous to Bernanke
et al. (1999, p.1349) and Van den Heuvel (2008, p.304), I assume that the firm must borrow an


















6Equivalent to maximizing the return on shareholders’ equity (ROSE).
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(net worth): Lt = Kt−QtEft . In other words, the firm finances its new physical capital purchases
in the beginning of the period by issuing equity to households (QtE
f
t ) and by borrowing from
banks (Lt). Firms will continue to issue shares only if the expected return on equity financing is
positive.7




where Kt−1 is physical capital, Ht is the demand of labour hours, and ξz,t is the technology. In
addition, nonfinancial firms face a borrowing constraint:
RltLt ≤ νKt, (4.8)
where ν is the nonfinancial firm’s loan-to-value (LTV) ratio.
Therefore, in each period, the firm chooses the desired amount of physical capital, labour and










subject to the production technology, Eq. 4.7, the borrowing constraint, Eq. 4.8, and the flow of
funds constraint
Ωft = Yt −WtHt − It + QtEft + Lt −Rlt−1Lt−1 − (Qt + V ft )Eft−1 − Φit. (4.10)
Φit = (κi/2δ)(It/Kt−1 − δ)2Kt−1 captures the capital installation costs, where It = Kt − (1 −
δ)Kt−1 is investment and δ is the rate of depreciation. Using the capital financing identity, Lt =
Kt − QtEft , and dividing Eq. 4.10 by the return on equity, Ret = (Qt + V ft )/Qt−1, gives the




Yt −WtHt + (1− δ)Kt−1 −Rlt−1(Kt−1 −Qt−1Eft−1)− Φit
Ret
−Qt−1Eft−1, (4.11)
defined as the value of shareholders equity (net income over the return on equity) minus the initial
equity investment (see, e.g., Van den Heuvel, 2008, p.304).









































7That is, if the expected real income from production covers the expected wage, the gross loan repayment and the
initial equity investment plus the dividend.
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QIt = 1 + κi/δ(It/Kt−1 − δ) is the shadow value of capital. Eq. 4.12 is the standard labour
demand schedule. Eq. 4.13 states that the return on loans must equal the expected marginal product
of capital plus capital installation costs, taking account for the marginal product of an additional
loan λft . Eq. 4.14 shows that the marginal product of an additional loan is positively related
to the discounted equity financing premium, such that the following holds: if Ret+1 > R
l
t then







In the frictionless case there are no constraints on credit, and the rates of return on debt and
equity are equalized. This implies that both rates of return equal the marginal product of capital.
Two important frictions arise from introducing the borrowing constraint: one, a standard Bernanke
et al. (1999) financial accelerator effect arises, and two, an increase in the equity financing pre-
mium increases the margin product of an additional loan. In addition, the borrowing constraint
ensures that the firm must maintain a proportion of capital, (Rlt − ν)/Rlt, as equity. Combining











The return on equity is therefore procyclical and linked to the marginal value of installed capital
(see also, Christiano and Fisher, 2003).
4.2.3 Banks
Analogous to nonfinancial firms, banks are owned by households and therefore maximize the re-
turn on shareholders’ equity. Banks issue loans to nonfinancial firms, and fund these assets with
deposits and bank capital (Kbt = QtE
b
t ). Following a recent string of macroprudential stud-
ies, banks face a non-binding capital requirement (e.g., Angelini et al., 2012; Angeloni and Faia,
2013; Brzoza-Brzezina et al., 2013). In this paper, quadratic costs arise when the bank’s leverage
ratio (Lt/Kbt ) deviates from the macroprudential instrument: the target leverage ratio τt. This
introduces two important conditions of financial intermediation. Firstly, it drives a wedge between
bank lending and funding rates. Secondly, the target leverage ratio can be governed by a macro-
prudential policy rule to mimic the effects of alternative Basel regimes. Because banks are subject
to a binding balance sheet identity, Lt = Kbt + Dt, deposits are taken as given. In other words,
given households’ demand for liquidity services from deposits, the bank will adjust Lt and Ebt to
maximize the return on shareholders’ equity.
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subject to the balance sheet identity and the flow of funds constraint
Ωbt = R
l
t−1Lt−1 −Rt−1Dt−1 − Lt + Dt + QtEbt −z(E, L)− (Qt + V bt )Ebt−1, (4.17)
where z(E, L) = κ/2(Lt/Kbt − τt)2Dt is the regulatory cost of intermediation measured by
deviations of bank leverage around a target leverage ratio τt. As with nonfinancial firms, using the
balance sheet identity and the return on equity, Ret = (Qt + V
b





Rlt−1Lt−1 −Rt−1Dt−1 −z(E, L)
Ret
−Qt−1Ebt−1. (4.18)
The first-order conditions for loans and equity are:
Rlt −Rt = zl(E,L), (4.19)




where zl(E, L) > 0 and −ze(E,L) > 0. In the frictionless equilibrium (κ = 0) Ret+1 = Rlt =
Rt. This implies that households derive zero utility from the liquidity provision of deposits, and
that firms do not face a borrowing constraint.
Combining Eqs. 4.19 and 4.20 gives the equity financing margin:










Eq. 4.21 states that when bank leverage rises above the target leverage ratio, τt, the required return
on equity increases relative to the return on loans. Comparing Eqs. 4.14 and 4.21 implies that
the discounted marginal product of an additional loan is proportional to the marginal cost from
increasing bank leverage. Subsequently, Ret À Rlt when bank leverage and the marginal product
of installed capital are increasing.8 This captures two key empirical features of the U.S. banking
sector. One, as leverage rises the cost of equity financing increases relative to debt financing
(Hanson et al., 2010, 2011). Two, in an environment of expanding bank balance sheets and a
widening equity premium, bank leverage is procyclical (Adrian and Shin, 2010b, 2013). That is,
leverage rises during booms and falls during busts.
Additional empirical evidence provided by Adrian and Shin (2010b, 2013) shows that U.S.
banks tend to adjust debt, rather than equity, to actively manage leverage. In other words, bank
capital accumulation is persistent. As it stands in the model setup, leverage requirements create
a wedge between the rates of return on equity and loans; however, banks are able to adjust their
balance sheet quantities to make this cost negligible. It is therefore necessary to derive a law of
motion for bank capital accumulation.
8To be consistent with nonfinancial firms, the bank should face a fixed proportional cost to both equity and debt
financing such that the spread, Re −Rl > 0. This, however, is not an issue for the log-linearized system of equations.
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To begin with, from the optimizing Eqs. 4.19 and 4.20, we can re-write the bank’s flow of
funds constraint as
RltLt −RtDt −Ret+1Kbt −z(E,L) = 0, (4.22)
where Kbt = QtE
b
t .
9 Substituting in the balance sheet identity Lt = Dt + Kbt and using R
e
t+1 =
(Qt+1 + V bt+1)/Qt gives
rltLt − rtDt = (Qt+1 + V bt+1)Ebt −QtEbt . (4.23)
Eq. 4.23 states that the net interest margin between the bank’s assets and liabilities must cover
the expected real capital gains (∆Qt+1Ebt ) plus the expected real dividend paid to households
(V bt+1E
b
t ). To introduce a law of motion for bank capital accumulation, we let the RHS of Eq. 4.23
equal Kbt+1 − (1− δ)Kbt :
(Qt+1 + V bt+1)E
b
t −QtEbt = Qt+1Ebt+1 − (1− δb)QtEbt (4.24)
∴ Qt+1(Ebt+1 − Ebt ) = −(δbQtEbt − Vt+1Ebt ). (4.25)
Therefore, Eq. 4.25 assumes an implicit cost for issuing new shares at price Qt+1. This cost is
equal to a fraction δb of the initial equity investment less the expected dividend payment. Given
this assumption, we can write the law of motion for bank capital accumulation, from Eq. 4.23, as
follows:
Kbt+1 = (1− δb)Kbt + (rltLt − rtDt). (4.26)
4.2.4 Macroprudential policy
Similar to Angelini et al. (2012) and Brzoza-Brzezina et al. (2013), the Basel III target leverage
ratio τt follows a countercyclical capital adequacy rule:









where ετ,t is an i.i.d shock to the target leverage ratio. The countercyclical policy rule is parame-
terized by κτ > 0 and 1 > ρτ ≥ 0. Under a Basel III countercyclical regime, banks accumulate
a capital buffer when output deviates above steady-state. This implies that the required leverage
ratio of banks is tapered during booms and elevated during busts. Alternatively, when the target
leverage ratio is reduced (raised) banks become overleveraged (underleveraged). When banks are
overleveraged (underleveraged), the return on equity increases (decreases) relative to the return on
loans.
9For simplicity, the regulatory cost term, z(E, L), will hereafter be ignored as it falls away in the log-linearized
equation.
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4.2.5 Closing the model
To close the model, the dynamic adjustment path of the risk-free real rate of interest, Rt, must be
specified. As documented by King and Watson (1996, p.48), RBC models tend to fail at repro-
ducing the negative correlation between the real rate of interest and output for U.S data (see also,
Begum, 1998; Christiano and Fisher, 2003; Garnier and Wilhelmsen, 2005).10 That said, King
and Watson (1996, p.48) find that generating a negative correlation is possible at the expense of
counterfactual business cycle moments for labour input (see also Table 4.3 below).
Based on the model setup, it is important to disentangle the influence of the banking sector
from the risk-free rate Rt for two reasons. Firstly, if banks are able to control Rt, given their
optimal responses for loans and equity, the impact of capital requirements on the real economy
becomes negligible.11 Secondly, as the bank capital accumulation equation is derived from the
flow of funds constraint, it rules out specifying an equation for the dynamic adjustment of de-








where, for simplicity, ρr is assumed to equal 0.
The aggregate resource constraint for the economy is
Yt = Ct + It +z(E,L). (4.29)
4.2.6 Introducing contingent convertible capital (CoCos)
Prior to conversion, CoCos are issued as debt instruments at a fixed rate of return. When the
bank’s capital-asset ratio falls below a predetermined level CoCos will automatically convert into
equity. At this trigger value, defined as the target leverage ratio τt, CoCo holders’ receive a certain
value of common equity in exchange for the original debt instrument Dt. Equity is issued at
the current market price, and can be issued up to the face value of the original debt instrument
(QtE
χ
t ≤ µDt). To introduce CoCos into the model developed here requires three assumptions.
First, deposits convert into equity with a probability θ at any given value of Lt/Kbt above the
trigger value τt. In other words, θ is uniformly distributed above τt. Second, the assumption of
perfect markets is relaxed, in which arbitrage implies that the real dividend yield must equal the
real rate of return on deposits. As a result, no arbitrage implies that the payoffs of debt and equity
instruments (carried over from period t − 1) may not equate. Third, given the CoCo constraint
Qt−1E
χ
t−1 ≤ µDt−1 the bank must first settle the optimal combination of debt and equity, given
the probability θ of debt converting into equity. That said, the bank’s balance sheet is still binding
in period t.
10These studies also show that the negative correlation of the real rate of interest is both a leading indicator and
contemporaneous.
11That is, deriving a rate of returns margin from the bank’s first-order conditions: see Eq. D.26 in the Appendix.
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Rlt−1Lt−1 −Rt−1(1− θµ)Dt−1 −z(E, L)
Ret
−Qt−1(Ebt−1 + θEχt−1), (4.30)



















where total bank capital KBt now comprises of the original bank capital K
b
t plus the value of newly
converted CoCo instruments, Kχt = QtE
χ




t , and Eq. 4.31 becomes the
original Eq. 4.21 in the model without CoCos.
Combining the first-order conditions for Dt and E
χ
t gives:
















Eq. 4.32 states that the marginal cost of leverage deviations is proportional to the expected payoff
of debt converting into equity at any given leverage ratio (Lt/KBt ) above the trigger value τt.
Conversely, when Lt/KBt < τt then θ = 0. Substituting Eq. 4.32 into Eq. 4.31 then gives the new
marginal cost of leverage deviations in financial intermediation.
The bank capital accumulation equation for Kbt can be written as follows:
Kbt+1 = (1− δ)Kbt + (rltLt − rtDt) + (Rt −Ret+1)θKχt . (4.33)




= Uc,t − βEt
[




Households’ preferences and nonfinancial firm technology are calibrated in line with the literature.
Bank balance sheets are calibrated to represent current U.S. banking conditions, whereas the real
rates of return on loans and equity are based on average real quarterly data from 1985Q1−2013Q4.
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 summarize the calibrated parameters and the implied steady-state values based
on the model setup.12
The seven preference and technology parameters are calibrated as follows. The inverse of the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption (γ) and the inverse of the Frisch elasticity
of labour supply (η) are set to 2. Habit formation φ equals 0.75. The capital-output share α is
12In the log-linearized equation, the bank’s steady-state balance sheet condition offsets the influence of κ in the
dynamic adjustment. Rather, the leverage ratio τ governs the degree of influence of balance sheet adjustments.
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Table 4.1: Calibrated parameters
Parameter Description Value
Households
γ Coefficient of relative risk aversion 2
φ Habit persistence 0.75
η Inverse of the Frisch elasticity 2
Nonfinancial firms
α Capital share in the production function 0.3
δ Capital depreciation rate 0.025
κi Capital installation costs 0.5
ν Loan-to-value ratio for firms 0.75
Steady-state rates
R Steady-state return on deposits 1.005
Rl Steady-state return on loans 1.015
Re Steady-state return on equity 1.035
Banks
τ Target leverage ratio 6.67
µ Ratio of CoCos to total debt 0.015
θ Debt to equity conversion rate 0.1
κr Real (natural) rate deviation rule 0.25
Table 4.2: Implied steady-state values from the model
Parameter Description Value
β Discount factor 0.966
Ud/Uc Liquidity services provided by deposits 0.029
αY/K Marginal production of capital 0.045
K/Y Capital-output ratio 6.634
I/Y Investment-output ratio 0.166
C/Y Consumption-output ratio 0.834
δb Fixed costs for bank capital management 0.072
Kχ/KB Ratio of CoCos to total bank capital 0.1
Note: the steady-state equations based on the model are
provided in the appendix.
set to 0.3, and the physical capital depreciation rate δ is set to 0.025. The parameter governing
capital installation costs (κi) is set to 0.5 (see, for example, Bernanke et al., 1999). Lastly, the
loan-to-value ratio for firms is set to 0.75.
Based on S&P500 data for equity prices and dividends, the average quarterly real return on
equity is 3.5% (Shiller, 2005, updated). Re = 1.035 matches a 15% annualized real return on bank
equity for the period 1985Q1−2008Q1 (Meh and Moran, 2010, p.565). Similar to the value chosen
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in the RBC setup of de Walque et al. (2010, p.1244), the steady-state values for the quarterly real
risk-free rate R and the real borrowing rate are set to 1.005 and 1.015, respectively.
For the banking sector, the steady-state target leverage ratio τ is set to 6.67, which corresponds
to an average bank capital-asset ratio of 15%. This is slightly above the average total equity to
total assets ratio of 11% for all U.S. commercial banks in 2013, but is similar to the 14% capital
adequacy ratio motivated by Meh and Moran (2010) and the 15% effective capital-asset ratio in
de Walque et al. (2010). Since 2009, the ratio of CoCos issued to that of non-CoCo subordinated
debt plus senior unsecured debt is 1.5% (Avdjiev et al., 2013). µ is therefore set equal to 0.015.
A reasonable assumption of 1.5% serves the purpose of this paper to study the mitigating effects
of CoCos under negative shocks to bank capital. Similarly, given a decline in bank capital, the
conversion probability from debt to equity (θ) is fixed at 0.1. A value of 0.25 for κr implies that
the real interest rate deviates 25 basis points below its steady-state when the output gap increases
1% (e.g., Laubach and Williams, 2003; Garnier and Wilhelmsen, 2005).
The remaining implied steady state values are reported in Table 4.2. In relation to the RBC
literature, the implied steady state values for the capital-output ratio (6.63) and the investment-
output ratio (0.17) are slightly below their normally observed values, K/Y = 8 and I/Y = 0.2
(de Walque et al., 2010). As a result, the consumption-output ratio (0.83), is slightly higher than
what is observed in the data between 1985Q1 and 2013Q4 (0.66). The discount factor β is the
reciprocal of the steady-state return on equity (see Eq. 4.5). The bank capital management costs
parameter δ equals 0.072. Based on the approximate estimate for µ and given τ , the ratio of
contingent convertible capital to total bank capital is set at 10%. All autoregressive parameters
for exogenous shock processes are standardized to equal 0.75, and innovations are independent
and normally distributed. A degree of persistence of 0.75 implies a lifespan of approximately four
years for technology and financial shocks.
4.4 Findings
Firstly, Section 4.4.1 explains the business cycle effects of bank capital regulation, from Basel I
through to Basel III. Subsequently, Section 4.4.2 looks at the effectiveness of CoCos in mitigating
negative shocks to bank capital, and whether there is potential for CoCos to complement the Basel
III regime with countercyclical capital requirements. Section 4.4.3 concludes with a comparison
of the business cycle moments produced by the model to those observed in the data. This exercise
also highlights the key role of financial shocks in reproducing business cycle characteristics.
4.4.1 Business cycle dynamics of the Basel regimes
The purpose of this subsection is to establish the business cycle effects of minimum capital re-
quirements under alternative Basel regimes. Similar to Angelini et al. (2012) and Brzoza-Brzezina
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et al. (2013), the Basel III target leverage ratio τt follows a countercyclical capital adequacy rule
(Eq. 4.27) where κτ = 2.14 is the standard deviation of the capital-asset ratio relative to out-
put. This means that the target leverage ratio of banks is tapered during booms and elevated
during recessions. In other words, banks accumulate a capital buffer when output deviates above
steady-state. Conversely, Basel II procyclicality can be emulated by inverting the sign for κτ (e.g.,
Angeloni and Faia, 2013, p.321). This generates the procyclical leverage observed for minimum
capital requirements under Basel II. For the Basel I regime, bank capital requirements are exoge-
nous, where κτ = 0 and τt becomes an exogenous AR(1) process. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show the
impulse responses to a productivity shock and a target leverage ratio shock, for each Basel regime.























































































Basel I  (κτ  =  0)
Basel II (κτ  = −2.14)
Basel III (κτ =  2.14)
Figure 4.1: Impulse response to a positive technology shock. From Basel I to Basel III.
In Figure 4.1 we immediately see the exacerbating effect of a procyclical Basel II regime. A
positive technology shock raises output, consumption and investment causing banks to expand
their balance sheets by taking on deposits and extending loans to firms. The demand for loans is
spurred on by the narrowing credit spread, whilst the rising equity premium reflects the bullish
market and the profitability of nonfinancial firms and banks. On the one hand, compared to Basel
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 4. COCOS AND BASEL III 73




























































































Figure 4.2: Impulse response to a reduced target leverage ratio. From Basel I to Basel III.
I, Basel II increases the volatility of bank balance sheets as well as the real economy. In particular,
banks become overextended in an environment of higher financing costs and lower returns on
assets, causing real investment and production to expand. Households’ smooth their consumption
paths by increasing savings, whilst a lower return on equity initially dampens consumption. On
the other hand, in a Basel I regime banks are required to raise capital to stabilize their leverage
ratios, which minimizes adverse bank balance sheet adjustments.13
For Basel III, countercyclical capital requirements effectively stabilize bank balance sheets
and business cycle fluctuations. By raising a capital buffer, in addition to the Basel I requirements,
credit extension is tapered and an overexpansion of the real economy is prevented. In fact, the
credit market stabilizes after seven quarters, with the real economy reverting to steady-state within
fifteen quarters. Overall, the results for the Basel regimes in Figure 4.1 confirm the findings in
de Walque et al. (2010), Christensen et al. (2011) and Angeloni and Faia (2013).
Figure 4.2 shows similar results for each alternative Basel regime under the banking sector
shock. Basel II is procyclical, and Basel III is countercyclical. Reducing the target leverage ratio
13With exogenous capital requirements the target leverage ratio remains constant, i.e., Basel I is time-invariant.
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of banks, analogous to requiring banks to hold more capital, impacts the business cycle as follows.
For Basel II, the effect on loans and the credit premium becomes more amplified than Basel I and
Basel III after five quarters. In addition, an overcapitalization of bank balance sheets crowds out
liquidity supply to and from banks. The result of a worsening credit market and increasing liquidity
shortages strengthens the negative effect of higher capital requirements on the real economy. The

















Figure 4.3: Equity-to-assets ratio for all U.S. banks
Moreover, the impact of minimum capital requirements is more clearly observed when the
steady-state target leverage ratio, and not only the dynamic adjustment thereof, changes. This can
be interpreted as the effect of an incremental increase in the level of minimum capital requirements
from Basel I to Basel III. Figure 4.3 shows the total equity to total assets ratio for all U.S. banks
from 1985Q1 to 2013Q4. The shaded areas correspond with the published dates of each Basel
Accord. The idea here is to roughly illustrate the incremental increase in the steady-state level
of bank capital-asset ratios after each Basel Accord. Figure 4.4 shows the impulse response to a
reduced target leverage ratio for a low versus a high steady-state capital requirement. Here, I keep
the target leverage ratio exogenous, and simply raise the steady-state capital-asset ratio from 10%
to 15% (i.e., τ = 10 and τ = 6.67, respectively). The increase in the steady-state capital-asset
ratio has a strong exacerbating effect on bank loans and the cost of credit. As a result, investment
in production activities declines, further reducing output. Although consumption initially rises
because of a better return on equity, it becomes negative after eight quarters.
The reasoning from the model setup is as follows. Based on the bank’s optimizing Eqs. 4.19
and 4.20, we can re-write the flow of funds constraint to derive the implied steady-state rate of
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Given R = 1.005, Rl = 1.015 and Re = 1.035, the implied steady-state value for the leverage
ratio τ equals 3. Its reciprocal gives a 33% bank capital-asset ratio. Therefore, as τ tends to 3
(i.e., reducing τ from 10 to 6.67) the bank approaches its optimal maximization point. Conversely,
given Re and R, the higher the leverage ratio the narrower the steady-state rate of returns margin
becomes. In the dynamic equation (4.21), this also means that the variability of the credit spread
and the equity premium is smaller for a given adjustment to the bank capital-asset ratio.
4.4.2 Contingent convertible capital
This subsection shows how contingent convertible capital complements the objectives of a Basel
III macroprudential policy. From the above analysis, it is clear that the shift from Basel II to
Basel III should reduce the impact of shocks on both the real economy and the financial sector.
However, two important drawbacks are observed. One, shocks to the business cycle are exacer-
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bated by higher steady-state levels of minimum capital requirements. Two, the Basel III regime is
not designed to counteract sudden negative shocks to bank capital. Here, contingent convertible
capital becomes a useful instrument for bank capital requirements. In that, once the debt instru-
ment converts into common equity the conversion is permanent. State contingent CoCos therefore
address permanent shifts in bank capital needs—without requiring banks to hold higher levels of
common equity to preempt episodes of financial distress. More importantly, the role of CoCos is
to automatically re-capitalize banks, reduce financial distress (in a timely manner), and mitigate
knock-on effects to the real economy.
To highlight this role, I compare impulse responses of the model with contingent convertible
capital to the one without (hereafter No CoCos). Figures 4.5 and 4.6 show the attenuating effect of
CoCos under a negative target leverage ratio shock and a negative bank capital shock. Figure 4.7
shows the impulse response to a technology shock. For the leverage shock and the technology
shock the target leverage ratio is kept exogenous.14 For the bank capital shock, the Basel III
regime combines with CoCos to highlight the comparative advantage of CoCos over countercycli-
cal capital requirements, in periods of financial distress. In each case, banks are required to raise
their capital-asset ratios to satisfy the target leverage ratio. Based on the model setup, CoCos will
convert into equity with probability 0.1 when the trigger value (Lt/Kbt ) is above the target level
(τt).
Figure 4.5 clearly shows the effectiveness of CoCos in mitigating financial distress. On the
one hand, for the No CoCos model, a positive shock to capital requirements causes a contraction in
loan supply and a widening credit spread. As a result, investment in production activities declines.
Although household consumption initially increases due to the positive wealth effect of equity,
output falls 0.32%. On the other hand, allowing for banks to hold contingent convertible capital
(see CoCos 1) significantly reduces the adverse effect of higher capital requirements, on both the
financial sector and the real economy. Firstly, the triggering of CoCos from debt to equity raises
overall bank capital and reduces the amount of debt on bank balance sheets. As a result, the
contraction in loan supply and the rise in the cost of capital halves. The knock-on effect to the real
economy is subsequently mitigated, with output now falling only 0.16%. Furthermore, increasing
the steady-state ratio of CoCos to total bank capital (Kχ/KB) from 10% to 25% further reduces
the instability caused by the shock (see CoCos 2). Although illustrative, this result clearly shows
a significant stabilization role for CoCos.
Indeed, an exogenous shock to capital requirements may reflect either a market response for
holding a capital buffer or a response to Basel regulatory requirements; but as shown for a positive
technology shock, an increase in bank leverage signals an overleveraged financial sector with
14When the Basel III regime combines with CoCos, the target leverage ratio becomes time-variant and endogenous
for all shocks. For this reason, I abstract from showing the combined results in Figures 4.5 and 4.7. That said, comparing
the impulse responses for Basel III and CoCos (i.e., Fig. 4.1 with Fig. 4.7; and Fig. 4.2 with Fig.4.5) is indicative of the
combined result for both shocks.
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CoCos 1 (Kχ/KB = 10%)
CoCos 2 (Kχ/KB = 25%)
Figure 4.5: Impulse response to a reduced target leverage ratio. Introducing contingent convertible capital.
excess credit supply (i.e., a build-up of systemic risk). To therefore test the flexibility of CoCos,
Figure 4.6 illustrates the effectiveness of CoCos under a negative shock to bank capital. Here, we
can interpret the trigger value to be linked to bank capital, and not the leverage ratio. In addition,
CoCos combine with the Basel III regime to show its relative dominance against financial shocks.
The results in Figure 4.6 follows closely to that observed for the target leverage ratio shock.
But instead of requiring banks to raise their capital-asset ratios, they must now attenuate the costs
of a fall in bank capital. CoCos effectively reduce the collapse in bank equity by half, and reduce
the effect of the shock on all the variables. More importantly, when the Basel III regime combines
with CoCos the stabilization effect only marginally improves. In particular, when the shock to bank
capital reduces credit supply and causes a fall in output, capital requirements are automatically
tapered. This means that banks are not required to raise bank capital immediately and, as a result,
leverage deviation costs are not transmitted onto the credit spread and the equity premium. This
mechanism, however, is not strong enough to improve on the stabilization effect of CoCos.
For the positive technology shock (Figure 4.7), introducing CoCos raises the aggregate bank
capital-asset ratio, but the adjustment is too small to influence the broader economy. Therefore,
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CoCos with Basel III
Figure 4.6: Impulse response to a negative bank capital shock. Introducing contingent convertible capital.
when banks become overleveraged because of a positive supply shock, a countercyclical capital
adequacy rule dominates. That is, the Basel III regime increases the bank capital-asset ratio sig-
nificantly more, thereby reducing business cycle fluctuations (see Figure 4.1). This, in fact, is
a desirable outcome for the following reasons. Firstly, CoCos are designed to react to negative
financial shocks, and not shocks to the real economy. For example, if the trigger value was tied to
the share price of common bank equity—and not the leverage ratio—then a positive technology
shock will not trigger a conversion of CoCos. Secondly, as positive supply shocks to the real econ-
omy tend to be more gradual and persistent, a countercyclical capital adequacy rule dampens the
build-up of excess credit supply. Conversely, over shorter horizons, CoCos effectively counteract
negative financial shocks.
4.4.3 Business cycle moments
Table 4.3 presents the cyclical properties of the data and the model. The standard deviations and
correlations of the U.S. data are calculated from the sample period 1985Q1−2013Q4. Model 1
shows the second moments produced by the model from a productivity shock, whereas, model 2
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Figure 4.7: Impulse response to a positive technology shock. Introducing contingent convertible capital.
includes a target leverage ratio shock and an equity premium shock in order to capture financial
market properties of the data, not explained by the traditional RBC theory. The productivity shock
(1%) and leverage shock (2.14%) correspond to one standard deviation observed in the data. The
equity premium shock is set to half a standard deviation (2.7%).
Model 1 reproduces the cyclical moments of the real sector fairly well: consumption is slightly
less volatile than output, while investment is over three times as volatile. Although the rela-
tive standard deviation of hours worked is consistent with the data, its correlation with output is
strongly negative. This counterfactual statistic is a result of the labour market setup being fully-
flexible in the model. For the financial sector, model 1 does reasonably well to capture the relative
standard deviations of firm loans and the credit spread, but their correlations with output are sig-
nificantly overestimated. For the equity premium and the bank capital-asset ratio, however, model
1 poorly reproduces both business cycle moments.
Including two uncorrelated financial sector shocks (model 2) improves almost all the results
of relative standard deviations and correlations. Similar to the results in de Walque et al. (2010),
adding the financial shocks raises the volatility of all the variables and reduces their correlation
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Table 4.3: Cyclical properties
standard deviation correlation
relative to output with output
Variable data mod.1 mod.2 data mod.1 mod.2
Output (Yt) 1 1 1 1 1 1
Consumption (Ct) 0.86 0.85 0.88 0.91 0.85 0.61
Investment (Vt) 4.97 3.32 4.81 0.93 0.73 0.69
Hours (Ht) 0.35 0.46 0.66 0.73 -0.99 -0.35
Firm loans (Lt) 2.08 1.53 1.94 0.38 0.97 0.72
Credit spread (Rlt −Rt) 1.35 1.12 1.51 -0.66 -0.88 -0.55
Equity premium (Ret −Rt) 5.30 0.85 3.53 0.02 0.998 0.04
bank capital-asset ratio (Kbt /Lt) 2.14 0.05 2.51 -0.28 -0.95 -0.35
Note: all variables, except for rates, are in log real terms and are detrended using the HP filter
(data list: see Appendix E).
with output. In particular, the statistics for all the financial variables are greatly improved at the
expense of lower correlations for consumption and investment.
4.5 Concluding remarks
Using a standard RBC model with an equity market and a banking sector, this paper shows that
countercyclical capital requirements (as in Basel III) and contingent convertible capital provide
an effective dual approach to macroprudential policy. On the one hand, a countercyclical capital
adequacy rule dominates CoCos in the stabilization of real shocks. That is, by raising a capital
buffer the Basel III regime mitigates the build-up of excess credit supply and, as a result, constrains
the expansion of overleveraged banks. On the other hand, CoCos have a strong advantage over the
Basel III regime against negative financial shocks. Here, CoCos effectively re-capitalize banks,
reduce financial distress in a timely manner, and mitigate knock-on effects to the real economy.
Countercyclical capital requirements and contingent convertible capital instruments therefore limit
financial instability, and its associated influence on the real economy.
The introduction of contingent convertible capital into the general equilibrium framework
comes with two clear shortcomings. One, alternative states cannot be an outcome of the model,
but rather imposed through exogenous shocks. Two, the technique used in the model setup to
combine bank deposits with subordinated debt (i.e., CoCos) is highly stylized. Given these short-
comings, however, the model does well to capture the mechanism for which CoCos are designed.
Furthermore, it is fairly straightforward to include nominal rigidities in the RBC framework, and to
observe how monetary policy interacts with macroprudential policy. As it stands, the model does
well to capture the cyclical properties of U.S. data, and further research adopting this framework
looks promising.
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Chapter 5
Summary
This dissertation emphasizes the financial instability inherent in modern financial markets and
the real economy, and provides a framework to study the financial factors that give rise to financial
instability. More specifically, it provides a deeper understanding of how financial intermediation
modifies the transmission mechanism of monetary policy and other macroeconomic shocks; and
includes new insights on limiting financial instability, and its associated influence on the real
economy.
To do this, I introduce a different aspect to dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
models with financial frictions. Namely, I develop a role for the equity market in financial interme-
diation, firm production and household consumption—termed the equity price channel. The idea
here is to capture the systemic interconnection between the financial system and the real economy.
This innovative model forms the foundation of three research papers which successively incorpo-
rates: the systemic and pro-cyclical effect of equity, the sources of credit spread variability over
the Great Moderation and Great Recession periods, and the role of contingent convertible capital
in Basel III macroprudential regulation.
The main findings of the study in chapter two are as follows. The equity price channel am-
plifies and propagates shocks to the real economy through both the financial accelerator channel
and the bank capital channel. Equity plays a significant role in amplifying the financial accelerator
effect on interest rates, inflation and household loans. Due to the direct wealth effect, a nega-
tive equity price shock decreases households’ consumption and, hence, output. The equity price
channel weakens the counter-cyclicality of bank capital-asset ratios, which reflects the increasing
emphasis on common equity capital in Basel regulations. This is beneficial in terms of financial
stability, but amplifies and propagates shocks to the real economy.
The results of the study in chapter three show that supply-side factors are the primary source
of credit spread variability. That is, retail loan markups account for more than half of the vari-
ability of retail credit spreads and sticky rate adjustments significantly alter the path of retail loan
rates relative to the policy rate. Monetary policy has a strong influence on the short-term interbank
rate, whereas the effectiveness of interest-rate policy on long-term nonfinancial loan rates is much
81
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weaker. Equity prices exacerbate movements in credit spreads through the financial accelerator
channel, but cannot be regarded as a main driving force of credit spread variability. Both the fi-
nancial accelerator and bank capital channels play a significant role in propagating the movements
of credit spreads. Across the last three U.S. recession periods (1990−91, 2001, and 2007−09) I
observe a remarkable decline in the influence of technology and monetary policy shocks. Whereas,
there is an increasing trend in the contribution of loan rate markup shocks to the variability of re-
tail credit spreads. From the demand-side of the credit market, the influence of LTV shocks has
declined since the 1990−91 recession, while the bank capital requirement shock exacerbates and
prolongs credit spread variability over the 2007−09 recession period.
In chapter four, I find that countercyclical capital requirements (as in Basel III) and contingent
convertible capital (CoCos) provide an effective dual approach to macroprudential policy. On the
one hand, a countercyclical capital adequacy rule dominates CoCos in the stabilization of real
shocks. That is, by raising a capital buffer the Basel III regime mitigates the build-up of excess
credit supply and, as a result, constrains the expansion of overleveraged banks. On the other hand,
CoCos have a strong advantage over the Basel III regime against negative financial shocks. Here,
CoCos effectively re-capitalize banks, reduce financial distress in a timely manner, and mitigate
knock-on effects to the real economy. Countercyclical capital requirements and contingent con-
vertible capital instruments therefore limit financial instability and its associated influence on the
real economy.
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Appendix A
Note on the core DSGE framework
General equilibrium models capture the simultaneous decisions that jointly determine eco-
nomic outcomes, including the short to medium term pathology we know as the business cycle.
It attempts, in addition, to explain crucial transmission mechanisms, particularly on the mone-
tary side. The specification and estimation of DSGE models specifically provides for analysis on:
sources of business cycle fluctuations, questions about structural changes, counterfactual scenar-
ios, and the link between structural features and reduced form parameters of the economy.
The current suite of DSGE models synthesise elements of new Keynesian economics and real
business cycle (RBC) theory, to form the benchmark framework widely used.1 The framework
is an open or closed economy based on micro-foundations and heterogeneous decision makers,
through which real and nominal rigidities arise (e.g., Smets and Wouters, 2003; Christiano et al.,
2005). In this model, the representative household consumes goods, supplies labour, holds money
and decides how much to invest in both the capital stock and bonds. The expected lifetime util-
ity function can be either separable or non-separable in consumption, leisure, and real money
balances, and household types can be distinguished by their preferences.2 Habit formation in
consumption and investment adjustment costs generate the hump-shaped responses of aggregate
demand. The model also features variable capital utilisation and fixed costs in the endogenous ac-
cumulation of capital.3 Firms, in turn, hire labour and rent capital to produce goods. To close the
real economy, fiscal policy is usually restricted to a Ricardian setting (see Elmendorf and Mankiw,
1998). The equilibrium conditions for this benchmark model without nominal rigidities are as fol-
lows: the real wage equals the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and labour; the
real rate of return on risk-free bonds drives intertemporal consumption; and the rate of return on
1See Kydland and Prescott (1982) and Prescott (1986) for the real business cycle approach and Clarida et al. (1999)
and Woodford (2003) for the new Keynesian economics.
2Depending on the research topic, real money balances will be excluded or substituted with a cash-in-advance
constraint (Walsh, 2010). More recently, however, other financial variables such as the housing stock have been included
in the utility function (Iacoviello, 2005).
3The modeling assumption of variable capital utilisation for households gives the same first-order conditions that
would arise if the firms own the capital stock.
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capital equals the marginal value of installed capital.
To introduce the elements of new Keynesian economics, the model can be extended so that
both households and firms face nominal rigidities. Specifically, the monopolistic supply of dif-
ferentiated consumption goods (or types of labour) implies price (or wage) setting behaviour. As
a result, nominal price and wage stickiness limits the ability of households and firms to respond
to new information in the economy. The most prominent method for capturing this is the Calvo
(1983) model of price and wage setting with partial indexation (e.g., Erceg et al., 2000).4 With
inflation expectations comes a role for monetary policy, in which an interest rate rule responds
to the deviations of inflation and output from their respective steady-states (Taylor, 1993a). Fi-
nally, various orthogonal structural shocks—often assumed to follow first-order autoregressive
processes—drive the stochastic nature of the dynamic general equilibrium model. The model has
the capacity to deal with supply side shocks such as total factor productivity and labour supply
shocks, demand side shocks such as investment-specific and exogenous spending shocks, mark-up
shocks on prices, wages and risk premiums, and monetary policy shocks.
4Other price-setting models have been introduced by Rotemberg (1982) and Taylor (1993b)
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Appendix B
The equity price channel
B.1 System of equilibrium conditions
This appendix summarizes the complete nonlinear model. The baseline (BEP) model includes all
32 endogenous variables and all 9 exogenous AR(1) shock processes. To go from the BEP model
to the model without equity (the NEP model), we set φw = φk = 1 and φB = φψ = 0, remove
Eqs. B.17−B.21 below, and ignore the following six endogenous variables: Ψst , Ψbt , Πψ,t, Πeψ,t,
ΠBψ,t, Q
ψ
t (note that in the NEP model ξψ,t = 0). To go from the BEP model to the flexible retail
rate (FI) model we simply set κh = κe = 0. For the ALT1 model we set φw = φk = 1, and for
the ALT2 model we set φB = 0. The 32 endogenous variables are as follows:
Yt, Ct, Cst , C
b


































Those variables jointly solve the following 32 equations:1
• Definitions:
U sc,t = (C
s
t − φCst−1)−γ ,
U bc,t = (C
b





1Note that Eq. B.11 and Eq. B.12 combine Pt and P ∗t to solve for inflation (Πt) in the usual log-linearized forward
looking Phillips Curve.
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B + Ψe, (B.3)
Ct = Cst + C
b
t , (B.4)
Lt = Lht + L
e
t , (B.5)
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[φkQkt+1Kt + (1− φk)Qψt+1Ψe], (B.23)
Pt
Dst







• Interest rate setting and bank balance sheet quantities:2




























































KBt = (1− δB)KBt−1 + φB(Qψt −Qψt−1)ΨB + (1− φψ)ωB,t−1, (B.28)
Lt = KBt + Dt. (B.29)
2In the log-linearized version we include a shock to deposits ξdt to avoid near stochastic singularity (see, e.g., Gerali
et al., 2010, p.116). Lower case net interest rates correspond with their respective upper case rates.
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t−1 + εp,t, (B.33)
ξz,t = ρzξz,t−1 + εz,t, (B.34)
ξi,t = ρzξi,t−1 + εi,t, (B.35)
ξd,t = ρdξd,t−1 + εd,t, (B.36)
εht = ρhε
h
t−1 + εh,t, (B.37)
εet = ρeε
e
t−1 + εe,t, (B.38)
νh,t = ρνhνh,t−1 + ενh,t, (B.39)
νe,t = ρνeνe,t−1 + ενe,t, (B.40)
ξψ,t = ρψξψ,t−1 + εψ,t. (B.41)
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Appendix C
Credit spread variability
C.1 Value-at-risk (VaR) constraint
As the investment bank runs the commercial bank operations, it must ensure that the commercial
bank’s capital buffer is large enough to cover the Value-at-Risk constraint in each period t =
0, 1, 2, 3, ... (see also, Adrian and Shin, 2010b, p.609). The following condition must therefore
hold for the commercial bank j ∈ [0, 1]:
k(1 + ict)L
c
j,t − s(1 + ilj,t)Lj,t ≤ Ξcj,t, (C.1)
where, for simplicity, ilj,t is the effective retail loan rate for households and entrepreneurs, and
s/k is the interbank LTV ratio νB .1 Ξcj,t is the quantity of cash balances (capital) transferred to
(or withdrawn from) the commercial bank’s balance sheet in the beginning of each period. As a
result, the following balance sheet condition must hold for bank j ∈ [0, 1] ∀ t = 0, 1, 2, 3, ... :
Ξcj,t = (k)L
c
j,t − (s)Lj,t. We can therefore re-write Eq. C.1 as
k(ict)L
c









The VaR equation states that the markup of the commercial bank’s net interest spread times νB
must be at least as large as its debt-to-asset ratio. If we further assume that Lcj,t = Lj,t = L
h
j,t +
Lej,t, it implies that the interbank LTV ratio must be bigger than or equal to the inverse of the
markup over marginal cost (ict/i
l
j,t). Note that Ξ
c
j,t will be a constant proportion (k − s) of the
feasible quantity of loans (Lj,t); but it is uninformative as it falls away in the consolidated bank
balance sheet.
C.2 Log-linearized system of equilibrium conditions
• Households
1See Woodford (2010, p.32) for the interpretation of s and k.
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1− φ(ct − φct−1) + ηht − aa(
1
Rh
− βh)νhφw(λht + νh,t), (C.4)








− βh)λht = βh(
γ











(1− φ)(1− βhR)(ct − φct−1) +
βhR
1− βhR (it − πt+1 −
γ
1− φ(ct+1 − φct))− ξb,t, (C.6)






1− φ(ct+1 − φct)] +
γ
(1− Γψ)(1− φ)(ct − φct−1)
+
Γψ
1− Γψ (λt + νh,t)− ξψ,t, (C.7)





(wt + ht) +
(1− φw)
Rh











− βe)λet = βe(γe(cet+1) + πt+1)−
1
Re




vt − kt−1 = βe(1−Υk)Et[vt+1 − kt] +
(1− βe(1− δe)−Υk)









t − cet+1). (C.9)
The shadow price of capital:
qkt = κv(vt − kt−1)− γecet , (C.10)
where Υk = 0 is the same as Iacoviello (2005, p. 760 (A3)).
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Production function





(qkt + kt−1) +
(1− φk)
Re





kt = (1− δe)kt−1 + δevt (C.13)






(yt − xt) + L
e
Y

















πt−1 − (1− θR)(1− θRβR)(1 + βRγp)θR xt + ε
p
t . (C.15)
• Unions and the wage-setting equation
The forward-looking sticky wage equation with price indexation
wt = Φwt−1 + ΦβEtwt+1 + Φ∗(εwηŵt + χ(
γ
1− φ(ct − φct−1) + ηht))
+ΦβEtπt+1 − Φπt − Φθwβγwπt + Φγwπt−1, (C.16)
where Φ∗ = (1−θw)(1−θwβ)
(1+θ2wβ)(1+ε
wη)
and Φ = θw
(1+θ2wβ)
; χ = 1
µw(1+λC̃νhφw)





ict = it −
κk
r
τ3(kBt − lt − ξτ,t) (C.17)
Bank capital accumulation
























Retail loan rate setting to households
îht =
κh









(1− νB)(εh − 1) + (1 + βB)κh î
c
t +
(1− νB)(εh − 1)
(1− νB)(εh − 1) + (1 + βB)κh µh,t, (C.20)
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is the stochastic markup shock.
Retail loan rate setting to entrepreneurs
îet =
κe









(1− νB)(εe − 1) + (1 + βB)κe î
c
t +
(1− νB)(εe − 1)
(1− νB)(εe − 1) + (1 + βB)κe µe,t, (C.21)
where µe,t =
εet
εet−1 is the stochastic markup shock.
Interbank spread and retail spread definitions (indexed by z = h, e)
st = ict − it, (C.22)
szt = i
z
t − ict . (C.23)
• Monetary policy and market clearing conditions























C.3 Tables and figures
Figure C.1 shows the impulse responses of the observed variables to a contractionary monetary
policy shock, for each recession period.2 It is clear that the impact of monetary policy shocks is
very similar in each sub-sample period. This suggests that the credit channel of monetary policy
behaved no differently during each recession. Monetary policy has a strong influence on the short-
term interbank rate, even though a narrower interbank credit spread (due to the increase in the
capital-asset ratio) somewhat dampens the policy shock. On the other hand, the effectiveness of
interest-rate policy on long-term nonfinancial loan rates is much weaker.
For all three recession periods, imperfect bank competition attenuates the effect of monetary
policy through both sticky rate adjustments and a counter-cyclical bank capital-asset ratio (see
also, Goodfriend and McCallum, 2007; Gerali et al., 2010). Retail loan rates increase sluggishly
compared to the policy rate, causing retail credit spreads to narrow. In fact, for all three sub-
samples, the initial 50 basis point increase in the policy rate results in a 30 basis point reduction
in each retail credit spread. Banks initially increase retail loan rates less than the policy rate
to minimize the reduction in credit demand. It curbs the fall of future retained earnings from
2For simplicity, I aggregate household loans and entrepreneur loans, and label it total loans. I also include the
impulse response function of the capital-asset ratio.
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Figure C.1: Impulse response to a contractionary monetary policy shock. U.S. recessions.
the decrease in the supply of total loans. The increase of the policy rate raises the demand for
safe assets, and reduces credit extension. This reduces production and consumption, leading to a
decline in output. The effect on inflation in all three sub-samples is negligible.
Figure C.2 sheds more light on the issue raised here. A positive bank capital requirement
shock raises the target capital-asset ratio to which banks stabilize. Subsequently, the shock trans-
mits through two channels: one, a wider credit spread minimizes the loss of retained earnings;
two, to stabilize their balance sheets, banks retract credit supply significantly. A positive capital
requirement shock produces qualitatively similar responses to that of the monetary policy shock,
with the exception of the interbank spread and the policy rate. Finally, compared to the 1990−91
and 2001 recessions, bank capital-asset adjustments exacerbate output in the 2007−09 recession.
The results above show that monetary policy cannot explain the severity or persistence of the
recent 2007−09 recession, whereas a financial shock to bank capital requirements presents one
alternative source for the severeness and persistence of the Great Recession.
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Figure C.2: Impulse response to a positive bank capital requirement shock. U.S. recessions.
Table C.1: Correlation of output with credit spreads and equity price
Variable Interbank spread Household spread Entrepreneur spread Equity price
(St) (Sht ) (Set ) (Q
ψ
t )
Output (Yt) -0.63 -0.16 -0.16 0.65
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Table C.2: U.S. recessions estimated parameter comparisons
Posterior distribution means Posterior distribution means
2007−09 2001 1990−91 2007−09 2001 1990−91
Parameters AR(1) processes
γ 4.023 3.983 4.250 ρz 0.98 0.98 0.98
γe 1.035 0.930 0.930 ρi 0.28 0.27 0.27
φ 0.672 0.691 0.671 ρb 0.97 0.97 0.97
θR 0.917 0.922 0.913 ρe 0.32 0.34 0.36
γp 0.487 0.481 0.493 ρh 0.31 0.34 0.31
κi 0.685 0.676 0.637 ρνh 0.79 0.89 0.80
κπ 1.511 1.509 1.534 ρνe 0.63 0.59 0.58
κy 0.254 0.253 0.255 ρψ 0.82 0.85 0.78
νh 0.743 0.739 0.747 ρp 0.32 0.30 0.31
νe 0.789 0.795 0.786 ρt 0.83 0.82 0.75
νB 0.365 0.368 0.383 εz 0.014 0.012 0.017
κk 1.382 1.575 1.955 εi 0.005 0.005 0.005
κe 4.965 8.435 6.096 εb 0.008 0.006 0.006
κh 11.06 13.31 8.29 εe 0.117 0.095 0.083
κv 2.073 1.588 2.008 εh 0.114 0.115 0.118
Ke/Y 10.71 10.76 10.77 ενh 0.019 0.016 0.022
ενe 0.020 0.023 0.036
εψ 0.007 0.005 0.007
εp 0.001 0.001 0.001
εt 0.010 0.008 0.010
Note: I exclude parameter descriptions, prior means and std. dev., and statistic
confidence intervals in the table due to the limited space. However, Tables 3.2
and 3.3 are a good guide.
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Appendix D
CoCos and Basel III
D.1 Log-linearized system of equilibrium conditions
• Households
Deposit demand
(1− βR)dt = γ(1− φ)(ct − φct−1)− (βR)Et
[
γ


















Steady-state condition: β = 1/Re
• Firms
Labor demand
wt = yt − ht (D.4)













where (αY /K) = Rl − (1− δ)− ((Re −Rl)ν)/Rl and Re > Rl.
Borrowing constraint
lt = νt + kt − rlt, (D.6)
where νt is an AR(1) stochastic shock.
Production function
yt = αkt−1 + (1− α)ht + ξz,t, (D.7)
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where ξz,t is an AR(1) stochastic shock.
• Banks
The equity financing margin
Reret+1 −Rlrlt = τ(τ − 1)κ(lt − kbt − τt), (D.8)










Evolution of state variables
kt = (1− δ)kt−1 + δit (D.10)
kbt+1 = (1− δb)kbt + rlτ(rlt + lt)− r(1− τ)(rt + dt) (D.11)
Risk-free real rate of return rule
rt = ρrrt−1 − κr(1− ρr)yt (D.12)
• Shock processes
ξz,t = ρzξz,t−1 + εz,t, (D.13)
τt = ρττt−1 − κτ (1− ρτ )yt + ετ,t, (D.14)
ξe,t = ρeξe,t−1 + εe,t, (D.15)
ξkb,t = ρkbξkb,t−1 + εkb,t. (D.16)
D.2 Model steady states


























= (1− βR) (D.22)
δb = rlτ − r(τ − 1), (D.23)
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where Ud and Uc are the marginal utilities of deposits and consumption.





(τ − 1) , (D.24)
and Eq. D.22 becomes:
Ud
Uc
= (1− β((1− θµ)R + θµRe)). (D.25)
D.3 The rate of returns margin
Based on the optimizing Eqs. 4.19 and 4.20, we can re-write the flow of funds constraint to derive











Therefore, if Rt ¿ Rlt and Rt ¿ Ret , then from Eq. D.26 Rlt ¿ Ret .
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Appendix E
Data and sources
Data source from the St. Louis Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED).
1. RGDP: Real Gross Domestic Product, 1 Decimal (GDPC1), Billions of Chained 2005 Dol-
lars, Quarterly, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate.
2. Consumption: Real Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCECC96), Billions of Chained
2009 Dollars, Quarterly, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate.
3. Investment: Real Gross Private Domestic Investment (GPDIC96), 3 decimal, Billions of
Chained 2009 Dollars, Quarterly, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate
4. Hours: Average Weekly Hours Of Production And Nonsupervisory Employees (AWH-
NONAG), Total private, Hours, Quarterly, Seasonally Adjusted.
5. Inflation: GDP Implicit Price Deflator (GDPDEF), Index 2005=100, Quarterly, Seasonally
Adjusted.
6. Nominal short-term interest rates (Percent, Quarterly, Not Seasonally Adjusted.): 3-Month
Treasury Bill: Secondary Market Rate (TB3MS); 3-month average of the daily Effective
Federal Funds Rate (FEDFUNDS); 3-Month AA Financial Commercial Paper Rate (CPF3M).
7. Deposit rate: US CD secondary market − 1-month, 3-month, 6-month middle rate, arith-
metic average of DCD1M, CD3M and CD6M respectively (see also, Pesaran and Xu, 2011,
p.46).
8. Treasury rate: 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate (GS10), Percent, Quarterly, Not
Seasonally Adjusted.
9. Loan rate to entrepreneurs: Moody’s seasoned Baa corporate bond yield (BAA), Percent,
Quarterly, Not Seasonally Adjusted.
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10. Loan rate to households: 30-Year Conventional Mortgage Rate (MORTG), Percent, Quar-
terly, Not Seasonally Adjusted.
11. Loans to households: Total Liabilities − Balance Sheet of Households and Nonprofit Orga-
nizations (TLBSHNO), Billions of Dollars, Quarterly, Not Seasonally Adjusted - includes
mortgage sector and consumer credit sector (equivalent to CMDEBT).
12. Loans to entrepreneurs: Total Liabilities − Balance Sheet of Non-farm Nonfinancial Cor-
porate Business (TLBSNNCB), Billions of Dollars, Quarterly, Not Seasonally Adjusted.
13. Deposits: Deposits − Assets − Balance Sheet of Households and Nonprofit Organizations
(DABSHNO), Billions of Dollars, Quarterly, Not Seasonally Adjusted (closely related to
M2SL).
14. Monetary authority funds: Total Credit Market Assets Held by Domestic Financial Sectors
- Monetary Authority (MATCMAHDFS), Billions of Dollars, Quarterly, Not Seasonally
Adjusted.
15. Equity: Standard and Poor 500 Index (SP500), Index, Quarterly, Not Seasonally Adjusted.
16. Loans to nonfinancial firms: Commercial and Industrial Loans (BUSLOANS), All Com-
mercial Banks, Billions of Dollars, Quarterly, Seasonally Adjusted plus Real Estate Loans,
All Commercial Banks (REALLN), Billions of Dollars, Quarterly, Seasonally Adjusted.
17. Bank capital-asset ratio: Total Equity to Total Assets for Banks (EQTA), Percent, Quarterly,
Not Seasonally Adjusted.
18. Return on equity: Return on Average Equity for all U.S. Banks (USROE), Percent, Quar-
terly, Not Seasonally Adjusted.
19. US population: Civilian Noninstitutional Population (CNP16OV), Thousands of Persons,
Quarterly, Not Seasonally Adjusted.
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